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Conflicts among religious and ethnic groups have scored American cultural
and political history. Some of these conflicts have involved campaigns of
suppression against deviant religious and minority ethnic groups by the
mainstream. Although the law has most often been deployed as an instrument
of suppression, there is now a public law consensus to preserve and protect the
autonomy of religious and ethnic subcultures, as well as the ability of their
members to self-identify without penalty. One thesis of this Essay is that this
vaunted public law consensus should be extended to sexual orientation
minorities as well.
Like religion, sexual orientation marks both personal identity and social
divisions.' In this century, in fact, sexual orientation has steadily been
replacing religion as the identity characteristic that is both physically invisible
and morally polarizing. In 1900, one's group identity was largely defined by
one's ethnicity, social class, sex, and religion. The norm was Anglo-Saxon,
middle-class, male, and Protestant. The Jew, Roman Catholic, or Jehovah's
Witness was considered deviant and was subject to social, economic, and
political discrimination. In 2000, one's group identity will be largely defined
by one's race, income, sex, and sexual orientation. The norm will be white,
middle-income, male, and heterosexual. The lesbian, gay man, or transgendered
person will be considered deviant and will be subject to social, economic, and
political discrimination.
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The foregoing contrast can be made at a normative level. At the turn of the
millennium, America is at least as religiously diverse as it was at the turn of
the century, but religion is less socially divisive and identity-defining. America
has internalized the idea of benign religious variation, that there are a number
of equally good religions, and one's religion says little or nothing about one's
moral or personal worth. The opposite is true of sexual orientation. The
concept of sexual orientation barely existed at the turn of the century,2 but it
is charged with normative significance at the turn of the millennium. Most
Americans reject the idea of benign sexual variation,3 that there are a number
of equally good sexual orientations, and that one's sexuality says little or
nothing about one's moral or personal worth. Just as most Americans in 1900
viewed significant religious deviation as strange, shameful, perverse, or even
wicked, so most in 2000 will view significant sexual deviation as strange,
shameful, perverse, or even wicked.
The contrast between religion and sexuality has another dimension.
Religious precepts are typically invoked as a reason for rejecting the idea of
benign sexual variation. Although the rhetoric of family values (or compulsory
heterosexuality) and sexual abstinence (or sex negativity) is often secular, it
has explicit resonance with the tenets of most American religions. Along with
abortion and school prayer, gay rights issues have galvanized religious activism
in the political arena. Gay rights rhetoric, in turn, has sometimes been
explicitly antireligious and usually seeks to relocate political discourse about
sexuality in secular rather than religious values. Although local skirmishes
between religion and gay rights had been frequent in the early 1970s, the focal
date for national attention to the public collision between homosexuality and
religion is 1977, when Anita Bryant's "Save the Children" campaign succeeded
in repealing a Dade County (Miami) law that prohibited discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation.4 After 1977, religious and gay groups have
engaged in regular pas de deux over nondiscrimination laws, sex education,
and proposals for the repeal of sodomy laws or the recognition of same-sex
2. Same-sex intimacy has existed in every human civilization, and its characteristic expression has
sometimes been considered sinful "sodomy" in Western culture. Nonetheless, characterization focusing on
a medicalized sexual orientation rather than on sinful sexual acts did not begin in earnest until the late
nineteenth century in Europe. See 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION
(Michael Hurley trans., 1978); JEFFREY WEEKS, SEX, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY: THE REGULATION OF
SExUALrrY SINCE 1800 (1981). The concept of "sexual orientation" was quickly embraced by American
doctors (1880s) but took longer to reach the popular culture (after 1900). See LILLIAN FADERMAN, ODD
GIRLS AND TWILIGHT LOVERS: A HISTORY OF LESBIAN LIFE IN TWENETH-CENTURY AMERICA 11-36
(1991). The term "homosexual" is only a century old. See David Halperin, Sex Before Sexuality: Pederasty
Politics, and Power in Classical Athens, in HIDDEN FROM HISTORY: RECLAIMING THE GAY AND LESBIAN
PAST 37-39 & nn.I-2 (Martin Duberman et a. eds., 1989).
3. The term is from Gayle S. Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of
Sexuality, in SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Nan D. Hunter eds., 1997).
4. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet: Establishing Conditions for
Gay Intimacy, Nomos, and Citizenship, 1961-1981, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 377 (1997).
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marriages or domestic partnerships. 5 A lot of the clashes between religious
and gay groups have ended up in court.
The public confrontations surprised no one. Religious and sexual
subcultures have value-laden visions for the lives of their members and for the
larger society as well. They tend to be, in Robert Cover's language, nornic
communities, people bonded by associations that preserve and develop a
common normative heritage.6 Nomic communities have a vision of what is
ethically right. That evolving vision constitutes an internal law that guides the
lives of their members. Cover saw religious groups (his focus) as the classic
law-creating, or jurisgenerative, communities. For all but the most insular
religious groups, their visions of value and law compete with those of other
communities, which today include gay and lesbian communitiesi' In the case
of nomic communities competing to persuade the polity of their different
values, Cover said, the judiciary stands available as a jurispathic, or law-
killing, institution. The very office of judging arises out of the need "to
suppress law, to choose between two or more laws, to impose upon laws a
hierarchy." s
Cover's understanding of contending visions of law, only one of which
will survive the lethal gaze of the judge, was echoed and contested by Justice
Scalia's dissenting opinion in Romer v. Evans.9 Romer held that a state
initiative preempting local gay rights ordinances violated the Equal Protection
Clause because its breadth reflected nothing more than anti-gay animus.
Echoing Cover, Scalia charged the Court with mistaking a "Kulturkampf,"
which Scalia probably meant as a culture clash between fundamentalist
religious and pro-gay nomoi, for a vicious "fit of spite."'" Challenging Cover,
Scalia denied that courts must play a jurispathic role and maintained that courts
should remain neutral in such culture clashes. He maintained that culture
clashes should be resolved in the popular and legislative arenas. Generally,
courts should steer clear of involvement by acquiescing in almost any
democratic resolution of that conflict.
Ironically, the term chosen by Scalia is more consistent with Cover's view
that it is hard for the judiciary to be neutral. Historically, Kulturkampf means
a state struggle to assimilate a threatening minority, or to force conformity
5. See CHRISTOPHER BULL & JOHN GALLAGHER. PERFECT ENE'.IIES: THE RE-uOIOUS RIGHT. THE GAY
MOVEMENT, AND THE POLITICS OF THE 1990S (1996); Nan D. Hunter, Life After Hardwick. 27 HARv C R -
C.L. L. REV. 531 (1992).
6. See Robert M. Cover, Thte Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Forewiord: Nomos and Narranve. 97 HARV
L. REV. 4 (1983), reprinted in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER
95-172 (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1992).
7. See Steven Epstein, Gay Politics, Ethnic Identity: 77te iamts of Social Constructonism. 93194
SOCIALIST REV. 9 (May-Aug. 1987), reprinted in FORMs Or DESIRE 239 (Edward Stein ed. 1989) (arguing
that gay subcultures are akin to ethnic ones).
8. Cover, supra note 6, at 40.
9. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
10. Id. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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upon it. The first Kulturkampf, the campaign that gave rise to the term, was
German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck's program between 1871 and 1887 to
yoke the Roman Catholic Church to ideological state control." Roman
Catholic practices were demonized as fit only for "womanly peoples" and
inconsistent with the centralized, homogenous, nation-state that Bismarck was
building.1 2 To reconcile the goals of state centralization and cultural
homogeneity with the deviant Catholic nomos, Bismarck asserted state control
over the education, appointment, and speech of parish priests; dismantled
church institutions; and expelled religious resisters. t3 Unlike later Nazi
policies, Kulturkampf was (is) a campaign of domestication and conformity,
not genocide and annihilation. Nonetheless, when the state acts as aggressively
as it does in a Kulturkampf, judicial acquiescence is jurispathic and scarcely
neutral, contrary to Scalia.
As exemplars of law's neutrality, Justice Scalia's dissent relied on two
precedents of the Court that instead illustrated extraordinary jurispathy. The
two most prominent examples of Kulturkampf in the United States during the
last hundred years were the campaign in the 1880s to discipline the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints and the campaign in the 1950s to suppress
homosexuality. The anti-Mormon Kulturkampf was ratified by the Supreme
Court's decision in Davis v. Beason14 (among other cases), which Scalia
invoked to support the proposition that a community can be excluded from
privileges of citizenship if there is popular moral disapproval of its members'
consensual practices. The antihomosexual Kulturkampf was ratified by the
Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick15 (among other cases), which Scalia
invoked to support the proposition that homosexuals can be excluded from at
least some privileges of citizenship if there is popular moral disapproval of
their consensual practices. Both decisions relied on mainstream religious
traditions to place sexualized groups (Mormons and homosexuals) outside of
the law because of their deviant, even if consensual, conduct (polygamy and
sodomy).
Part I of this Essay will start with the Kulturkampf connection and will
argue that religion and sexual orientation have much in common as identity
categories, that antireligious prejudice is systemically similar to anti-gay
prejudice, and that the religion clauses of the First Amendment as they have
been developed in the last generation are a model for the state's treatment of
sexuality. The First Amendment's protections of free speech, association, and
press are the leading constitutional assurances against Kulturkampf. The
11. See HELMUT W. SMITH, GERMAN NATIONALISM AND RELIGIOUS CONFLICT: CULTURE, IDEOLOGY,
POLIrIcs, 1870-1914 (1995).
12. See id. at 54, 62, 79.
13. See id. at 40-41.
14. 133 U.S. 333 (1890), discussed in Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1635-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
15. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), discussed in Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1631-33 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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religion clauses embody a more particularized vision of nomic diversity along
lines of religious belief. The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, as
read by the Court, prevents the state from censoring deviant religions and, as
provisionally implemented by Congress, prevents the state from unduly
discriminating against religious belief. The Establishment Clause prevents the
state from enforcing religious orthodoxy. Similar rules against censorship,
discrimination, and orthodoxy are being developed, and should be developed,
by courts and legislatures to protect sexual orientation minorities as well. Thus,
I read the religion clauses as embodying a more general public law insight:
The state must allow individual nomic communities to flourish or wither as
they may, and the state cannot as a normal matter become the means for the
triumph of one community over all others. This is a constitutionalism inspired
by the positive value of diversity and by the negative experiences of
Kulturkampf, exemplified historically by both gay and religious experience.
Gay and religious groups should join together in opposing state
Kulturkampf, but instead they often part company when the state guarantees
sexual equality. Part II of this Essay explores issues raised when religious
liberty and sexual equality norms collide. With the advent of vigorous
antidiscrimination laws that incidentally restrict expression, the collision of
nomic communities is today often accompanied by a collision of constitutional
commitments, between the liberty of one group to exclude and express its
disapproval, and the desire of an excluded group for equal treatment. Cover is
right to tell us that in situations of direct clash the state typically cannot remain
neutral, but he provides few insights as to how the state ought to resolve the
clash. He overstates the matter if he is read to insist that nonneutrality means
jurispathy.'6 Among the most interesting and important cases are those
involving direct or indirect clashes between religious and gay communities.
Emblematic is the controversy between Georgetown University, where I teach,
and the Gay Rights Coalition of the Georgetown University Law Center, an
early name for the gay, lesbian, and bisexual student group for which I am an
adviser. I use the Georgetown case as a field upon which to discuss different
ways of treating the equality and liberty interests of gay and religious groups.
The judicial resolution of the controversy, in the opinion delivered by Judge
Julia Cooper Mack of the District's Court of Appeals, was jurisgenerative in
16. Notwithstanding these reservations, I agree that gay and religious nornot often interact in the way
Cover describes, each appealing to the jurispathic judge to kill off the other's law or to squelch the other's
efforts to transform existing law. Just as earlier ethnic and religious conflicts involved group animosity and
violence, the current conflicts between gay and religious nomnoi have been rancorous I do not see that
rancor, or even deep conflict, as inevitable. When there is conflict. I pan company with Cover in that I see
a less jurispathic role for courts. Rather than inevitably killing substantive law and rendenng one group
triumphant, courts can create structures and procedures of cooperation that are law-sustaining
Aspirationally, the most important role for courts in our system is to serve as a brake against Kulturkampf
and its echoes, where the state itself is enlisted in a campaign to suppress not only law. but the nomic
communities themselves.
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a way that respected the Roman Catholic nomos without acquiescing in its
wrongness on issues of sexual orientation.
Part II further, and more ambitiously, argues that the Georgetown case
reflects a distinctively but not uniquely "gaylegal"' 7 jurisprudence. One
defining contribution of gaylaw derives from the gay experience of "coming
out of the closet." This phenomenon and its history suggest several ideas and
principles that illuminate the Georgetown case, especially the value of identity
speech and its relevance for both sides of the controversy, and that lend
support to Judge Mack's opinion, especially its accommodation of each side's
identity needs and the encouragement of nomic dialogue. Most generally, the
jurisprudence of coming out contributes to the public law project of
understanding and constructively resolving identity clashes, a project
impressively initiated by Professor Kenneth Karst and others."8 Part III of the
Essay applies these ideas to other recent culture clashes that have ended up in
court: the Boston parade case, 9 where the Supreme Court permitted exclusion
of lesbian, gay, and bisexual marchers; the Presbyterian landlord case,2"
where the California Supreme Court required a landlord to rent an apartment
to a couple whose unmarried cohabitation offended her religious beliefs; and
the Indianapolis pornography case,2 where the Seventh Circuit disallowed
local tort remedies against pornographers whose material harmed women.
I. IDENTITY IN AMERICA: CONNECTIONS BETWEEN RELIGION AND
SEXUALITY
While often at loggerheads today, religion and sexual orientation have
much in common as identity categories. Similarly, antireligious prejudice has
manifested itself in American history in ways not unlike antihomosexual
prejudice. The two great American Kulturkampfs of the last century involved
groups defined by their religion (Mormons in the 1880s) and sexual orientation
(homosexuals in the 1950s). The First Amendment has been read to deploy
American public law to prohibit censorship of, discrimination against, and
orthodoxy of religion. This Part concludes with an argument that the reasons
for protection of religious belief and nomoi require similar constitutional
17. "Gaylegal" jurisprudence examines the law as it applies to lesbians, bisexuals, and gay men or
from a gay point of view. (Consistent with common usage, I often deploy "gay" to refer to homosexual
women and men.) There is no single gaylegal angle for the cases discussed in this Essay. Nor should
gaylaw (the noun) be taken as simply parochial. This Essay maintains that gaylaw can contribute insights
to law generally and that gaylegal arguments such as these can be persuasive to straight audiences as well.
18. See KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CmiZENSHIP AND THE CONSTrrrION
(1989) (synthesizing earlier articles); KENNETH L. KARST, LAW'S PROMISE, LAW'S EXPRESSION: VISIONS
OF POWER IN THE POLITICS OF RACE, GENDER, AND RELIGION (1993); Hunter, supra note I.
19. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 115 S. Ct. 2338 (1995).
20. See Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996).
21. See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd mem., 475 U.S.
1001 (1986).
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protections against censorship of, discrimination against, and orthodoxy in
matters of sexual orientation.
A. Religion and Sexuality as Identity Categories and Objects of Prejudice
During the 1994 hearings on the proposed Employment Non-
Discrimination Act (ENDA), a federal bill to prohibit sexual orientation
discrimination in the workplace, Senator Nancy Kassebaum wondered why
sexual orientation, a behavioral characteristic, should be protected when civil
rights laws have traditionally protected only status-based characteristics. 22
Witnesses pointed out that civil rights laws have traditionally protected against
discrimination based on religion, which, like sexual orientation, involves
behavior as well as status. Senator Kassebaum was incredulous: While there
are "certain behavioral characteristics that one could associate" with religion,
she noted, it is not a characteristic based wholly on behavior, as is sexual
orientation.2 3 Senator Kassebaum's remarks misconstrue sexual orientation,
for it is based on a similar mix of cognition and conduct as religion. Religion
involves both thought and action; a typical Presbyterian believes in God's
omnipotence and mercy, and engages in activities such as churchgoing, prayer,
charitable contributions, and other conduct characteristic of her religion. Sexual
orientation involves both thought and action; a typical lesbian feels erotic
attraction or strong emotional bonds to other women and engages in sexual and
social activities with other women.24
Senator Kassebaum's widely shared incredulity stems from the cultural
phenomenon whereby homosexuality (the status) is considered equivalent to
sodomy (the conduct). From her point of view, the conduct part of
homosexuality dominates, if not obliterates, the cognition part. Gay people see
the matter differently. For us, sexual orientation is a feature of our personal
make-up, our gender nonconformity, even our way of looking at things. More
important, the tendency of mainstream society to view gay people through the
totalizing, and hysterical, lens of sexual acts is one reason we need the
Employment Non-Discrimination Act. Consider this thought experiment. When
Kassebaum sees an open lesbian, she thinks, "here is someone who performs
perverse sexual acts," not, "here is a sister who loves and appreciates women
and their beauty in a way I was not taught." When Kassebaum sees an openly
heterosexual woman, she does not think "here is someone who performs
22. See Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) of 1994: Heanngs on S 2238 Before the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Human Resources. 103d Cong. 44--45 (1994)
23. Id.
24. See infra note 28. Some have suggested. in commenting on a draft of this Essay. that religion is
more a matter of belief, while sexuality is more a matter of desire, both of which I subsume under thought
I think this formulation overstates the differences, linking one to the domain of the intellect, and the other
to the domain of the emotions. Both religion and sexuality involve feelings and emotions as well as beliefs
and ideas, and so I am disinclined to put weight on any difference in the overall mix of emotion to belief
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perverse sexual acts," even though that woman is more likely to have engaged
in anal sex than the lesbian and almost as likely to have engaged in oral
sex. 5  This cognitive process is erroneous. What distinguishes the
heterosexual woman from the lesbian is not behavior so much as desire and
status: The lesbian desires other women and by doing so challenges the
orthodoxy of compulsory heterosexuality.
Now perform my thought experiment from another angle. In the 1950s, in
rural Appalachia where I grew up, some Protestants could look at an openly
Roman Catholic person and think "cannibalism,"26 not "here is a brother who
loves and appreciates God in ways I was not taught." Or, because Roman
Catholic theology opposed birth control, many Protestants viewed Catholics as
"sexually promiscuous." Roman Catholics saw these matters differently, and
so do almost all of us today. When Senator Kassebaum sees a self-identifying
Roman Catholic today, she thinks, "here is a brother who loves God, etc.," not
"cannibalism." This is good. What she focuses on is the cognition she shares
with the Catholic, not the conduct she does not share. A goal of
antidiscrimination laws is to change our focus, from behavior-based negative
stereotypes to more positive appreciation of connections in the face of
cognitive diversities.
Consider from the perspective of equal protection concerns the deep
categorical and historical similarities of religion and sexual orientation. They
are identity characteristics that have much in common, especially in contrast
to sex, ethnicity, or race-the categories most prominent in current
antidiscrimination laws. At the most superficial level, religion and sexual
orientation are usually not apparent to casual observation and are not known
unless the person self-identifies. In contrast, sex, race, and (to a lesser extent)
ethnicity are usually apparent upon casual observation, unless the person makes
an effort to cloak these characteristics. Religion and sexual orientation cannot
even be surmised from the most careful inspection of the person's physical
characteristics, for they are identities based upon beliefs, feelings, cognitions,
and emotions. We reveal our religious or sexual identities only by what we say
and in what religious- or sexual-specific conduct we engage. Thus a religious
or sexual orientation minority can almost always "pass" for mainstream, simply
by expressing the religious or sexual views associated with the majority and
25. See EDWARD 0. LAUMANN ET AL., THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY: SEXUAL
PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES 98-99, 318-20 (1994) (finding that 73% of heterosexual female sample
had engaged in oral sex, versus 82% of females reporting lesbian experiences; and over 20% of
heterosexual women had engaged in anal sex (lesbians not asked)).
26. Roman Catholics believe in transubstantiation, that during Communion the bread and the wine
actually become the flesh and blood of Christ. Because they are ingested by the communicants and the
priest, thinking this to be so, the practice was labelled cannibalistic. Roman Catholics, in turn, could look
at an openly Jewish person and think "Christ killer," or "food fetishist," rather than "here is a brother who
loves God in a different way than I was taught."
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keeping secret the conduct characteristic of one's minority group.2' More
important, religious and sexual identity is dependent upon the ability and
willingness both to express the identity and to engage in activities
characteristic of the identity.s
One's sex, race, and ethnicity are popularly seen as biologically
determined in a straightforward way: They are the same as or a hybrid of the
sex, race, and ethnicity of one's parents. Although one's religion and sexual
orientation are often the same as those of one's parents, they need not be and
often are not. That the impulse behind religion and sexual orientation is not
completely predetermined creates room for speculation, conversion, and nosy
intervention. There is a human tendency to view one's own religion and sexual
orientation as "given," impelled, or even driven by inner needs or external
forces, but to view a "deviant" religion or sexual orientation as "chosen" for
some perverse or even malignant reason. 29 That perspective is just as wrong
as the determinist one, however. While one's religion and sexual orientation
are not biologically predetermined, neither are they completely voluntary. One
rarely engages in a process of information-gathering, deliberation, and
shopping to hit upon a religion (assuming one is serious rather than just social
about religion) or a sexual orientation. The impulse comes from feelings we
do not consciously process or understand.
Finally, religion and sexual orientation tend to be more normative than the
other identity categories. Both are spiritual as well as moral and are
characterized by bonding with a cohort of people linked by similar emotions
and beliefs, moments of ritual ecstasy and fantasy, and fascination with
27. The social boundaries defined by ethnicity are often so porous as to allow passing. however See
EVE KOsOFsKY SEDOWICK, EPISTEIOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 75-81 (1990) (discussing story of Queen
Esther, who averts genocide against her people by "coming out" to her husband. King Assu6rus) Sex and
race, of course, can be porous as well. Women have successfully passed for men throughout Western
history, and some people can pass for members of a different race. The point in the text is only that these
cases are exceptional, while religious and sexual minorities routinely pass
28. Hence the famous Kinsey scale of sexual orientauon considers the person's sclf-identilication. her
or his erotic fantasies, and her or his actual sexual activities. A Kinsey 6 is someone who identitfies as a
homosexual, has only same-sex fantasies, is only attracted sexually to people of the same sex. and has had
exclusively same-sex experiences. See ALFRED C. KINSEY ET AL. SEXUAL BEHAViOR IN Tim Ht.%AN
MALE 638-41 (1948). A similar exercise can be conducted for religion. A devout Catholic (a John Paul
6) is someone who identifies as Catholic, believes Catholic theology, regularly takes Communion. goes to
confession, and so forth.
29. I am open to the following difference. Religion might be easier to change than sexual onentation
Religious conversion experiences are common and are seen as a genuine change from one religious
viewpoint to another. The convert "sees the light" just as Saul of Tarsus did on the road to Damas-us. the
classic conversion experience (he even changed his name, to Paul). See Acts 9:1-22 Earlier Amencan
sexologists notwithstanding, there is little evidence that homosexuals convert to hetrosexuality or vice-
versa. The married person who comes out as gay usually thinks of the expenence less as a conversion from
one identity to another than as a discovery about an identity he or she had all along None of the foregoing
analysis relies on the (controversial) thesis that sexual orientation is hard.wured genetically See Janet E
Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from lmnubablity. 46
STAN. L. REv. 503 (1994). Even scientific critics of the "hard-wred homosexuals" hypothesis believe that
sexual orientation is a trait rooted early in life and beyond "conscious" choice or control See. e g.
RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 101-05 (1992) (surveying various theories)
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sumptuary pomp and deviation. Religious and sexual orientation communities
are institutionalized, albeit in different ways. Religious community is focused
around the local church or congregation, which is often the lowest rung in a
larger hierarchy; sexual community is more loosely focused around a larger
variety of subcultural institutions, including churches or faith groups,
newspapers, professional associations and social clubs, and "gay ghettoes."
Given these striking similarities between religion and sexual orientation,
it is not surprising that antireligious prejudice in American history bears
systematic resemblance to the more recent antihomosexual prejudice. Most
religious groups that are considered mainstream today have been the objects
of intolerance and state-imposed disabilities in the past, including Jews, Roman
Catholics, and Baptists.3' Like disabilities placed upon homosexuality, those
placed on deviant religions stem from the firm belief that the majority religion
or sexual orientation is universally true and that the existence of other religions
or orientations is harmful or dangerous. The attitudes underlying prejudice,
whether against religious or sexual minorities, are attitudes of intellectual
orthodoxy and coerced conformity. The attitudes are "prejudiced" if there is
scant reason to believe that religious or sexual deviations are actually harmful
or dangerous, apart from the anxiety they create in the fearful mind.
Persecution and Kulturkampf flow from prejudice when majority culture feels
insecure in general and threatened by a minority gaining in social power or
public visibility.
3'
Nativist and racist hysteria was the characteristic reaction in the United
States to periods of intense social tension from the colonial period until after
World War I; the objects of nativist hysteria were ethnic and, especially,
religious minorities. Ideological and sexual as well as racist hysteria has been
the characteristic social reaction in the United States to periods of intense
social tension since World War I. The scholarship describing antireligious
prejudice in the United States and other western societies discovers the same
pattern as that found in anti-gay prejudice: Disempowered segments of the
majority demonize or scapegoat religious "deviants" as predatory threats and
invoke their supposed predation as a justification for violence against deviants.
Specific tropes include warnings that the polity faces irrevocable decline
because of corrosive forces within the society; depiction of the despised
religious group as dirty, immoral, lecherous, subversive, disloyal, and militant,
based upon unrepresentative examples or simple fabrications; and fixation on
30. For the discussion that follows, I draw on the scholarship about "nativist" movements of religious
persecution in American history. The germinal work is JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PAITERNS
OF AMERICAN NATIVISM, 1860-1925 (corr. ed. 1965). See also sources cited infra note 32. My thinking
has also been influenced by the work of Benzion Netanyahu. See, e.g., B. NETANYAHU, THE ORIGINS OF
THE INQUISmON IN FIFTEENTH CENTURY SPAIN (1995).
31. Cf. NETANYAHU, supra note 30, at 5 ("For it is an iron-clad rule in this history of group relations:
the majority's toleration of every minority lessens with the worsening of the majority's condition, especially
when paralleled with a steady improvement of the minority's status.").
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the ways in which the despised group is bent on "recruiting" normal citizens,
particularly the young.3" Antireligious discourse is characterized by the same
rhetoric as Senator Kassebaum's antihomosexual discourse: denial that there
is discrimination based upon belief or status and insistence that any legal
disabilities or discrimination is based upon the deviant group's (vile) behavior.
Once mobilized at the state level, social prejudice against a religious or
sexual minority aims at suppression or erasure of the minority and its nomos.
The extreme goal is elimination, from outright genocide to expulsion and exile
to forced conversion. The more moderate goal is assimilation, where the
minority renounces its distinctive nomic values and conforms at least in part
to majority beliefs and practices. Whatever the ultimate goal, the processes for
achieving it are expensive, requiring great mobilization of the state apparatus
to hunt down deviants and reprogram, expel, or imprison them. Because an
intense campaign of re-education, suppression, or erasure is so costly, it
usually does not last long and is succeeded by an accommodation of some sort.
Sometimes the accommodation is a truce premised on the view that the deviant
group has survived.33 More often, it is premised on the view that the deviant
nomos has been defeated and can be assimilated into the mainstream
culture.34 In the latter instance, a remnant of the deviant minority goes
underground, typically with the understanding that the state will not seriously
look for them, an understanding breached sooner or later. This regime, where
the minority pays homage to the shame attributed to them by keeping their
identity secret in exchange for survival, is now known as the "closet."35 In
American public law it bears the tag, "don't ask, don't tell."
B. Anti-Mormon and Antihoinosexual Kulturkampf in the United States
The process described in the last paragraph is Kulturkampf. The classic
Kulturkampfs in western history have been religious, such as the Spanish
32. See NATIVISM, DISCRIMINATION, AND IMAGES OF LMMIGRANTs (George E PoZZcutta ed, 1991).
LEs WALLACE, THE RHETORIC OF ANTI-CATHOLICISM: THE A tRICAN PROThcTIVE ASSOCIATION.
1887-1911 (1990).
33. This was the result of Bismarck's Kulturkampf against the Roman Catholic Church. which the Iron
Chancellor abandoned as early as 1878. The antireligious campaign was largely ineffectual. served to
politicize Roman Catholics against the state, and ended with a recognition that German nationalism did not
require confessional unity for its success. See ERICH SCHMIDT-VOLKMAR DER KuLTURKAM F IN
DEUTSCHLAND 1871-1890 (1962); SMITH, supra note I1, at 19-49; Ronald I Ross. Enforcing tie
Kulturkampf in the Bismarckian State and the Limits of Coercion mn Imperial Germany. 56 1 MOD HtsT
456 (1984).
34. This was the conclusion of the anti-Mormon Kulturkampf of the 1880s. which ended when the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints abandoned its endorsement of plural mamage tn this life. and
the Territory of Utah criminalized bigamy and cohabitation in the constitution it presented as pan of a
statehood application. More extreme consequences flowed from the Kulturkampf against the Spantsh Jews
in 1391, which resulted in exile, expulsion, and massive conversions to Christianity See NETANYAH.
supra note 30, at 127-213.
35. See Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Sywnbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened Scrutny for Gays.
96 COLUM. L. REV. 1753 (1996).
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pogroms between 1391 and 1482 which produced the Marranos (Jews who
converted to Catholicism),36 the religious purges and wars of the late
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, and secular campaigns against the
Roman Catholic Church and Judaism in Europe and the United States in the
mid- and late nineteenth century.37 The most ambitious Kulturkampfs
undertaken by the United States in the last century further illustrate conceptual
and tangible connections between religious and sexual deviance.
After the 1840s, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints
encouraged its members to engage in plural marriage. Polygamy was
controversial within the church and generated considerable anti-Mormon
sentiment that pressed the community to relocate in the Utah Territory, where
the federal government became its chief foe. Congress enacted the Morrill
Anti-Bigamy Law38 to criminalize Mormon polygamy in the Territory of
Utah, but the law was virtually unenforced until the 1870s. 39 In 1874, federal
authorities convicted Mormon elder George Reynolds of criminal bigamy. He
appealed his conviction as inconsistent with the First Amendment's protection
of his free exercise of religion. Without questioning the sincerity of Reynolds's
beliefs, Chief Justice Morris Waite's opinion for a unanimous Court in
Reynolds v. United States4 held nonetheless that the First Amendment was
not violated. The Court reasoned that Reynolds's religious beliefs could not
immunize his unlawful conduct. Polygamy was "odious" conduct that was
inconsistent with Anglo-American tradition of marriage and undermined not
just marriage but the stability of the polity as well. 41 Although the Latter Day
36. See BENzION NETANYAHU, THE MARRANOS OF SPAIN, FROM THE XIVTH TO THE EARLY XVITH
CENTURY (2d ed. 1973); NETANYAHU, supra note 30.
37. The anti-Catholic campaigns in Europe are noted in SMITH, supra note 11, at 19 (citing Winfricd
Becker, Der Kulturkampfals europtiisches und als deutsches Phinomen, 101 HISTORISCHES JAHRBUCH 422
(1981)).
38. Morrill Anti-Bigamy Law, ch. 125, 12 Stat. 501 (1862) (codified at Rev. Stat. § 5352).
39. RICHARD S. VAN WAGONER, MORMON POLYGAMY: A HISTORY 107 (2d ed. 1989).
40. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
41. The Court explained:
Polygamy has always been odious among the northern and western nations of Europe, and,
until the establishment of the Mormon Church, was almost exclusively a feature of the life of
Asiatic and of African people. At common law, the second marriage was always void, and from
the earliest history of England polygamy has been treated as an offence against society.
... In the face of all this evidence, it is impossible to believe that the constitutional
guaranty of religious freedom was intended to prohibit legislation in respect to this most
important feature of social life. Marriage, while from its very nature a sacred obligation, is
nevertheless, in most civilized nations, a civil contract, and usually regulated by law. Upon it
society may be said to be built, and out of its fruits spring social relations and social obligations
and duties, with which government is necessarily required to deal. In fact, according as
monogamous or polygamous marriages are allowed, do we find the principles on which the
government of the people, to a greater or less extent, rests. Professor Lieber says, polygamy
leads to the patriarchal principle, and which, when applied to large communities, fetters the
people in stationary despotism, while that principle cannot long exist in connection with
monogamy.
Id. at 164-66 (citation omitted). For an excellent historical exploration of the political theory of marriage
embedded here, see Maura I. Strassberg, Distinctions of Form and Substance: Monogamy, Polygamy and
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Saints were shocked that the Court upheld Reynolds's conviction, the decision
did little to undermine the church's faith in, and its members' practice of,
plural marriage.
The antibigamy law that Reynolds was convicted of violating was the
precursor of a broader campaign to destroy the Latter Day Saints themselves,
so long as they adhered to plural marriage. 2 Presidents Hayes, Garfield, and
Arthur led a federal campaign against Mormon polygamists. In Congress,
Senator George Edmunds, Republican of Vermont, procured legislation making
"unlawful cohabitation" (easier to prove than polygamy) a federal crime,
depriving polygamists of their right to vote and to serve on juries or in public
office, and offering amnesty to polygamists who renounced their religious
practice.13 Apostle John Henry Smith witnessed the House vote for
Edmunds's bill in 1882 and lamented: "'The Republicans were filled with
venom and were bent on the accomplishment of their purpose .... God our
Father must judge these men for their evil design and [I] doubt not he will do
so in his own good time."'" The Supreme Court did not consider the design
evil enough to be unconstitutional and sustained the Act.4 5
With all three branches of the federal government united in a desire to
erase or change the Mormon nomos, a Kulturkampf followed. More than one
thousand Mormon polygamists, or "cohabs," were hunted down by federal
marshals who specialized in their capture, convicted by juries packed with non-
Mormons, and sentenced to imprisonment, some for long periods of time. In
prison, the Mormons were attacked by convicted murderers, thugs, and legions
of bedbugs. Latter Day Saints found they could avoid these horrors by
renouncing their religious practice, for judges were inclined to let repenters off
with fines. Yet Mormon resistance continued. The church refused to budge on
this religious principle, and significant portions of the faithful and almost all
the church elders continued to engage in plural marriages.
The federal government responded with the Edmunds-Tucker Act of 1887,
which disenfranchised not only Mormon polygamists but also any person
advocating polygamy, declared Latter Day Saints' property forfeit to the
United States for the church's crime against marriage, made it easier to prove
guilt in polygamy cases, abolished elective offices in Utah and made officials
subject to federal appointment, declared children of plural marriages
illegitimate and prohibited their inheriting from their parents, and abolished
Same-Sex Marriage, 75 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 1997).
42. The campaign to destroy the Latter Day Saints is descnbed in VAN WAGONER. supra note 39. at
115-22; and in Orma Linford, The Mormons and the Law: The Polygamy Cases (pts I & 2). 9 UTAH L
REv. 308, 543 (1964-65).
43. See The Edmunds Act, ch. 47, 22 Stat. 30 (1882) (codified at 48 U.S-C. § 1461) (repcaled 1983)
44. Quoted in MERLO PUSEY, BUILDERs OF THE KINGDOM-GEORGE A. SMITH. JOHN HeNRY SMITH.
GEORGE ALBERT SMITH 135 (1982).
45. See Cannon v. United States, 116 U.S. 55 (1885) (criminal cohabitation): Clawson v United States.
114 U.S. 477 (1885) (jury service); Murphy v. Ramsey. 114 U.S. 15 (1885) (dtsenfranchiscment)
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female suffrage in Utah.' The United States Supreme Court upheld these
various invasions of civil and religious liberties in two decisions, The Late
Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. United States
47
and Davis v. Beason.45
Those Supreme Court decisions confirmed the constitutional sanction for
anti-Mormon Kulturkampf. The campaign was successful in that the leadership
of the Latter Day Saints officially abandoned polygamy as a religious principle
after Beason.49 The campaign was less successful in that it drove polygamy
underground. Leading Mormons continued to practice plural marriage for years
after the church's capitulation; after the Latter Day Saints hierarchy actually
abandoned plural marriages, many of the faithful continued to embrace them.
Even today, there are sects of fundamentalist Mormons who preach and
practice polygamy in this life, and who were persecuted as recently as the
1940s and 1950s. In 1944, the Salt Lake City police arrested forty-six Mormon
fundamentalists for violating Utah's anticohabitation law and confiscated their
magazine, Truth, as lewd and obscene because of its advocacy of polygamy.
50
State charges were dismissed, but fifteen men went to prison for transporting
their plural wives in interstate commerce for "immoral purposes." The
Supreme Court upheld these convictions in Cleveland v. United States.5'
Mormons cooperated in a 1954 raid on a fundamentalist community in Short
Creek, Arizona, and the Church raised no protest against the state's arrest of
polygamists and its confiscation of their children.52 Notwithstanding this
persecution, plural marriage in this life is still accepted and practiced as a
foundational principle among Mormon fundamentalists.53
There are striking parallels between the anti-Mormon Kulturkampf of the
1880s and the antihomosexual Kulturkampf of the 1950s. 54 Just as the
longstanding crime of bigamy became mobilized in the 1870s as a mechanism
for regulating Mormon plural marriage, the longstanding crimes of sodomy,
46. See The Edmunds-Tucker Act, ch. 397, 24 Stat. 635 (1887) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 633, 660)
(repealed 1978).
47. 136 U.S. 1 (1890) (allowing confiscation of Latter Day Saints' property).
48. 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (holding that membership in Latter Day Saints church can be basis for
denying right to vote).
49. See VAN WAGONER, supra note 39, at 133-52.
50. See id. at 190-92.
51. 329 U.S. 14 (1946).
52. See VAN WAGONER, supra note 39, at 192-97.
53. See JESSE L. EMBRY, MORMON POLYGAMOUS FAMILIES (1987). As I now (perhaps imperfectly)
understand current Latter Day Saints doctrine, Mormon men may no longer have plural wives in this life
but will have them in the afterlife. While polygamy still has a place in Mormon theology, both theology
and practice responded decisively to the state Kulturkampf. See also NETANYAHU, supra note 30, at
xvii-xxi (arguing that forced conversion of Spanish Jews to Catholicism "worked"; Marranos were not
"secret Jews," for most part, but assimilated steadily into Spanish Catholicism until Inquisition assailed
them for trumped-up heresies).
54. The details of the antihomosexual terror are recounted in WILLIAM N. ESKRIDOE, JR., GAYLAW:
CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET ch. 2 (forthcoming 1998); and in William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Privacy Jurisprudence and the Apartheid of the Closet, 1946-1961, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 703 (1997).
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solicitation, cross-dressing, disorderly conduct, and lewdness were deployed in
the 1950s as mechanisms for regulating homosexual intimacy. Since then, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly reviewed the application of sodomy laws to
consensual same-sex intimacy and, as it had done in Reynolds and the other
Mormon cases, upheld them against any and every constitutional attack."5
Resting, as Chief Justice Burger said, on "millennia of moral teachings"
against homosexuality, Hardwick in 1986 was only the last in a line of these
decisions. Hardwick is a modem echo of Reynolds, for in both cases
defendants' "deviant" sexual activities were criminalized because their
activities were inconsistent with prevailing religious morality.
Like the Mormon who openly married more than one person, the
homosexual who openly engaged in sexual relations with someone of the same
sex was per se a criminal, and was condemned as a major social menace and
threat to the stability of the polity. A 1950 Senate subcommittee report made
out the case against having "homosexuals and other sex perverts" in the
government. 56 The report concluded that "those who engage in overt acts of
perversion lack the emotional stability of normal persons,"" and "indulgence
in acts of sex perversion weakens the moral fiber of an individual to a degree
that he is not suitable for a position of responsibility."5' Furthermore,
"perverts will frequently attempt to entice normal individuals to engage in
perverted practices. This is particularly true in the case of young and
impressionable people who might come under the influence of a pervert....
One homosexual can pollute an entire office." 59 This report echoes the
paranoid political consequences of polygamy expressed by Professor Francis
Lieber, whose theory of the state was the basis for Reynolds.'
State and federal governments invested substantial resources in campaigns
to search out and expose homosexuals in big cities, in the armed forces, and
in state and federal employment. When simple detection and prosecution
proved insufficient, federal and state governments engaged in campaigns to
lure homosexuals into violations of law. They also adopted additional
regulatory mechanisms that raised the stakes of sexual nonconformity. The
55. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 487 U.S. 186 (1986) (reJecting privacy and Ninth Amendmeni
challenge); Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney. 435 U.S. 901 (1976) (summarily afftrming thrcc-judge
court's rejection of privacy challenge); Rose v. Locke. 423 U.S 48 (1975) (rejecting vagueness challenge).
Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 1 (1973) (same); Wade v. Buchanan. 401 U.S. 989 (1971). re,'g Buchanan
v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970) (rejecting privacy challenge)
56. SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON EXPENDITURES IN THE EXECTmrVE
DEP'TS, INTERIM REpORT, EMPLOYMENT OF HOMOSEXUALS AND OTHER SEX PERVERTs IN GOVERNMENr
(Dec. 15, 1950).
57. Id. at 4.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 3.
60. See supra note 41.
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homosexual arrested for solicitation of consensual sex in the 1950s, usually by
responding to a come-on from a decoy cop or agent provocateur, faced not
only a possible jail or prison sentence, but also familial and social ostracism
when names of arrested people were reported by the press; loss of employment
in either the public or private sector and of any security clearance needed for
many scientific and federal jobs; loss of professional licenses; potential
indefinite incarceration in a mental institution if found to be a "sexual
psychopath"; required registration as a sex offender with police departments
and reporting of activities and movements; the break-up of one's marriage and
loss of custody of one's children; surveillance by the FBI (wiretapping and
spying) and the Post Office (opening people's mail); and expulsion from the
country if one were not a citizen.6' Just as the Supreme Court upheld novel
and heightened penalties against Mormon polygamists in the nineteenth
century, the Supreme Court and lower courts upheld novel and heightened
penalties against homosexual sodomites in the twentieth.62
The foregoing comparison says as much about the American judiciary as
it does about religion and homosexuality. Judges at the time of the campaigns
acquiesced in the political consensus that demonized the despised groups. No
Supreme Court justice or federal judge cast a single vote to invalidate the anti-
Mormon or antihomosexual Kulturkampfs during their peaks (1883-90 and
1947-55, respectively).63 Some judges showed mercy to individual
defendants, but most did not, and many were willing to bend established rules
of law to assist the state campaign. The constitutional analysis that follows
maintains that these campaigns are inconsistent with our current understandings
of constitutional rights. This sort of post hoc analysis is possible, however,
because it is far removed from the hysterias of the eras it criticizes. There is
no compelling reason to believe that judges will not acquiesce to the next
Kulturkampf. What follows are simply reasons to think that they should not
and to hope that they will not.
61. See Eskridge, supra note 54.
62. See Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118 (1967) (interpreting immigration law to require deportation of
bisexual as "psychopathic personality"); Kameny v. Brucker, 282 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (allowing
federal government to deny employment and security clearance to man charged with homosexual
"lewdness").
63. I denote 1947 as the start of the antihomosexua panic; this was the year the antihomosexual
witchhunts began in earnest in the federal civil service, armed forces, and state civil services, and saw the
beginning of many municipal campaigns against same-sex socializing. The craze passed its peak after the
"Boys of Boise" scandal, which broke in 1955. See JOHN GFRASSi, THE BoYs OF BOISE: FUROR, VICE,
AND FOLLY IN AN AMERICAN CrrY at xv-xvii (1966). After the peak of the antihomosexual campaign, the
Supreme Court in a one line per curiam opinion reversed Post Office censorship of One, Inc., the leading
homophile magazine. See One, Inc. v. Oleson, 355 U.S. 371 (1958) (per curiam). Four years later, the Court
reversed censorship of male physique magazines that homosexuals found erotic. See Marual Enters., Inc.
v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
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C. Constitutional Protections Against Religious or Sexual Censorship and
Discrimination
Reynolds, Beason, and Latter Day Saints, the three Supreme Court
decisions that ratified the anti-Mormon Kulturkampf, are in some tension with
the structure and diversity values of the First Amendment. The right of
association the Supreme Court has found in the Amendment assures nomic
communities the right to band together without state suppression or
discriminatory harassment. The community and its members have strong rights
to speak freely, to assemble peaceably, to petition and lobby the government,
and to publish their views, all under the protection of specific clauses in the
First Amendment. The religion clauses prevent the state from burdening the
free exercise of religious faith and from establishing any state religion. I read
the religion clauses as echoing more general constitutional principles of
anticensorship, nondiscrimination, and rejection of orthodoxy. The state must
allow nomic communities to flourish or wither as they may, and the state
cannot as a normal matter become the means for the triumph of one
community over all others.
The anti-Mormon decisions are inconsistent with recent developments in
American public law, albeit developments only possible because the political
culture has internalized the idea of benign religious variation. The Supreme
Court held in Sherbert v. Verner' that the Free Exercise Clause prevents a
state from substantially burdening a citizen's exercise of religion unless it can
show a compelling state interest. Under Sherbert and the Court's right to
privacy cases, Reynolds ought not stand: The state's interest in preventing
consensual bigamy or cohabitation, the crime in the Mormon polygamy cases,
is no longer the compelling interest it was in the nineteenth century.,5 Even
if Reynolds were good law under Sherbert, Beason and Latter Day Saints
would not be, for they are deeply inconsistent with any vision of recent
constitutional theory and practice. The Court's modem free speech
jurisprudence is inconsistent with Beason's holding that the state can criminally
64. 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that state cannot refuse to provide unemployment benefits to woman
fired because she would not work on her Sabbath).followed in Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n.
480 U.S. 136 (1987) (same); see also Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec. 489 US 829 (1989)
(holding that state cannot deny unemployment benefits to person who refuses to work on personal Sabbath.
not one of recognized religion).
65. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion) Five Justices voted
to invalidate a regulation making it a criminal violation for non-family members to live together, four
Justices on privacy grounds and one Justice (Justice Stevens) on takings grounds. See also Etsenstadt v
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding that right of privacy protects use of contraceptives by unmamed
couples). I am open to the argument that prohibiting polygamy serves a state interest in creating family
structures that are relatively conducive to gender equality. Cf. VAN WAGONER. supra note 39. at 89-104
(describing frequently terrible experiences of wives in Mormon plural marriages. but notring that many other
marriages were happy ones). The argument is, however, necessarily speculative and. more importantly,
cannot justify the criminal penalties imposed in Reynolds.
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punish mere advocacy of polygamy.66 The cases recognizing a fundamental
right to vote would probably require a different result than Beason's
willingness to deny Mormons the right to vote because of their status,67 and
the Free Exercise Clause after Sherbert surely prohibits the state from
suppressing an entire religion simply because popular majorities consider its
practices immoral.6s
In 1990, the Supreme Court rejected the Sherbert approach to the Free
Exercise Clause, holding that a neutral state regulation of general application
that incidentally burdens someone's free religious exercise is valid unless it
implicates another constitutional concern.69 Even under the Court's current
free exercise jurisprudence, Reynolds is wrong to the extent that it invaded
privacy rights, and Beason and Latter Day Saints are wrong because the anti-
Mormon statutes of the 1880s were not neutral laws of general application.
They were enacted with the intention, and had the effect, of suppressing a
religion, which violates the Free Exercise Clause under post-1990 caselaw.
70
Moreover, Congress reinstated the Sherbert approach as a statutory right with
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).71 Section 2000bb-I
of the Act provides that government can "substantially burden a person's
exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the
person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is
the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest."72 If held to be a constitutional exercise of Congress's authority (an
issue now before the Court),73 RFRA would surely require Reynolds, Beason,
and Latter Day Saints to come out differently.
I would make the following generalizations from the religion cases. First,
the religion clauses have been read to disable the state from imposing religious
orthodoxy on the population and, more specifically, from conducting an
antireligious Kulturkampf such as the anti-Mormon campaign or Bismarck's
campaign against the Catholic Church. That reading is suggestive of both the
least that the religion clauses can mean as well as of their most important role.
The anti-Mormon Kulturkampf was harmful to thousands of people and was
66. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (holding that advocacy of unlawful action cannot
be criminalized unless lawless action is "imminent").
67. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (holding that durational residence requirements
violate Equal Protection Clause).
68. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that state cannot force Amish children to
attend public schools). Beason stands for the proposition that polygamy can be the basis for denying any
kind of civil right and, read with Reynolds, for imprisonment for long periods as well. One can be critical
of polygamy as an institution while still being open to tolerance of polygamy as a religious practice because
of its spiritual importance for many people. See JoHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 91-113 (Currin V.
Shields ed., Bobbs-Merrill 1956) (1859).
69. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
70. See Church of the Lukumi Babula Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
71. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-l to 2000bb-4 (1994).
72. Id. § 2000bb-l(b).
73. See Flores v. City of Boeme, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 293 (1996).
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an unproductive expenditure of state resources. Like other Kulturkampfs before
it, the campaign against the Mormons had powerful effects. Most Mormons
ultimately conformed to the accommodation outlawing plural marriage, and the
Latter Day Saints church now endorses traditional religious orthodoxy in
matters of sex and marriage during its members' life on earth. As read today,
the religion clauses stand for the proposition that forced conformity in matters
of religion is an unworthy goal, and certainly not a goal justifying the human
suffering, anger, and cruelty imposed by the campaign.
Second, the Free Exercise Clause has been read to prohibit state censorship
of or discrimination against particular religious noici. Thus the state cannot
dictate to religions what they must say or cannot say, and the state cannot
discriminate against particular religions. Sherbert, now codified in RFRA, also
reads the Free Exercise Clause to prevent the state from imposing unnecessary
burdens on religious nonoi. Even when state law does not target religious
expression, it may not interfere with it without substantial justification. It
remains to be seen how stringent an obligation this is. The Supreme Court
before RFRA did not press the idea very far, and neither did most lower courts
after RFRA. The key normative point is that the Free Exercise Clause operates
as a super-Equal Protection Clause for classifications based on religion or
(under RFRA) having an effect on religion.
Third, the overarching principle that emerges from the American
experience is the idea of benign religious variation. It is both acceptable and
good that we are a nation of diverse religious communities. It is acceptable
because there is no single religious truth and the practice of forced conversion
is inconsistent with fundamental freedom in our country. And religious
diversity is good because it offers spiritual and emotional satisfaction to a
broader range of people, including lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals, many of
whom are devoutly religious and worship in mainstream denominations or in
gay-oriented Metropolitan Community Churches all around the country."
Given the similarities between religion and sexual orientation, religious and
sexual nomoi, and antireligious and antihomosexual prejudice, roughly the
same precepts should govern American public law of sexuality: The state is
presumed to have no authority to engage in a Kulturkampf against sexual
minorities; the state has a presumptive duty not to censor people's sexual
expression or discriminate on that ground; and the affirmative principle is one
of benign sexual variation, according to which it is acceptable and good that
we are a nation of diverse sexualities.75 Senator Kassebaum's untenable
74. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 46 & app (1996) 1 am
aware that religious diversity protects many religions dedicated to antihomosexual messages, but this is not
a neutral or even rational reason to oppose diversity, Also. as openly lesbian and gay people demonstrate
that homosexuality is not monstrous, religions now intolerant of homosexuality might soften their views
See HOMOSEXUALITY AND WORLD RELIGIONS (Arlene Swidler ed., 1993)
75. I propose to set aside the popular fixation on child molestation as the consequence of tolerated
sexual variation. That is no more true than the idea that human sacrifice is the consequence of tolerated
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distinction between behavior-based sexual orientation and belief-based religion
surely reflects her view, shared by most Americans, that religious variation is
benign but sexual orientation variation is not. A generation of biologists,
sociologists, and anthropologists have studied the latter point and have
overwhelmingly concluded-in my opinion, without any serious scientific
disagreement-that most sexual orientation variations are in fact benign.76
Because there are no "sexuality clauses" in the Constitution analogous to
the religion clauses, the foregoing precepts are aspirations of where public law
ought to be rather than binding constitutional rules. Yet all three precepts can
inform our reading of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, just as their analogues informed recent
congressional as well as judicial interpretations of the religion clauses of the
First Amendment. As Justice Scalia complained in his dissenting opinion,
Romer v. Evans77 opens up the Due Process (Hardwick) and Equal Protection
(Romer) Clauses to such a reading.
II. A JURISPRUDENCE OF COMING OUT:
GAYLEGAL PRECEPTS FOR RECONCILING COLLIDING LIBERTY AND
EQUALITY NORMS (THE GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY CASE)
The meta-precepts of benign religious and sexual variation support
affirmative as well as negative obligations for the state. Just as the state is
constitutionally prohibited from engaging in public antireligious or
antihomosexual persecution, censorship, or discrimination, so it should be
constitutionally encouraged to prohibit private censorship or discrimination on
the basis of religion or sexual orientation. The Civil Rights Act of 196478
prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion in employment, public
accommodation, and education.79 If enacted, ENDA would prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in employment. Nine states,
the District of Columbia, and more than a hundred municipalities prohibit
employment discrimination based on sexual orientation, and most of these
religious variation. Just as the religion clauses would allow the state to reject religious precept as a
justification for "mistreating" children, so the approach outlined in text would allow the state to discipline
adult pedophiles who sexually "molest" children.
76. See generally ALAN P. BELL & MARTIN S. WEINBERG, HOMOSEXUALMES: A STUDY OF
DIVERSITY AMONG MEN AND WOMEN (1979) (sexual sociology); CLELLAN S. FORD & FRANK A. BEACH,
PATTERNS OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR (1951) (anthropology); HOMOSEXUALITY: RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS FOR
PUBLIC POLICY (John C. Gonsiorek & James D. Weinrich eds., 1991) (psychology); ALFRED C. KINsBY
ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE AMERICAN FEMALE (1953) (biology); THE MANY FACES OF
HOMOSEXUALITY: ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR (Evelyn Blackwood ed.,
1986) (anthropology).
77. 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1629 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 1971-2000 (1964).
79. See also Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (1994) (prohibiting most secondary schools from
discriminating against religious clubs).
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jurisdictions also prohibit such discrimination in housing and public
accommodations.80
Because these antidiscrimination laws necessarily restrict economic
liberties of employers, landlords, and those frequenting public
accommodations, they have presented a new generation of public law
problems. Among the most discussed, and intractable, of the problems involve
collisions of attractive public law norms. This Part will focus on collisions
between the norms of religious liberty and sexual orientation equality. There
is no easy or universal method for resolving these normative collisions. Cases
are particularly fact-bound, and so I use litigation which arose between
Georgetown University, a Roman Catholic institution, and lesbian, bisexual,
and gay students, as a field upon which to think about these issues. What I
hope to do is to derive helpful principles from the gay and, to some extent,
religious experience of "coming out" of the sexual, and religious, closet.
A. The Georgetown University Case
The most sharply defined legal clash between gay and religious nonoi
culminated in a decision by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Gay
Rights Coalition of Georgetown University Law Center i. Georgetown
University.81 Founded in 1789, the same year our Constitution was written,
Georgetown is a university in Washington, D.C., that is affiliated with the
Roman Catholic Church. While there are no religious tests for admission or
employment at the University, a majority of its trustees are typically officers
of the Church, and, since 1825, each president of the university has been a
member of the Society of Jesus (the Jesuits). In late 1977, one group of gay
and lesbian students organized at the University's main campus and one group
at the Law Center. Their stated goals were nomic: to foster "an atmosphere in
which gay people can develop a sense of pride, self-worth, awareness, and
community" (the main campus group) and to provide information to lesbian
and gay students about the area's gay community (the Law Center group).
82
Beginning in academic year 1978-79, the main campus group sought to obtain
University recognition that would give it access to services and benefits
routinely available to other student groups, such as an office. Reasoning that
University recognition would imply approval of gay and lesbian activities,
80. See sources cited infra note 146.
81. 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987) (en banc). I have examined this decision in an earlier work from the
perspective of statutory interpretation theory, see WILUA.Ni N ESKRIDE. JR. DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 174-204 (1994), and of jurisprudential history. see William N Eskndge. Jr & Gary
Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form. 89 MIcI L REV
707 (1991). My account of the case is drawn not only from the comprehensive judicial discussion and the
trial record, but also from the oral history of the case being compiled under the auspices of the Georgetown
University Law Center's Bisexual, Lesbian, and Gay Students' Association (BiLAGA)
82. Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 8 n.5.
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which was contrary to Catholic religious doctrine, Georgetown denied the
students' first application in 1979 and every other application after that.
The two student groups sued Georgetown, arguing that its refusal to
recognize them and make available services and benefits accorded other
student groups violated the District's Human Rights Act of 1977, which makes
it "an unlawful discriminatory practice.., for an educational institution...
[t]o deny, restrict, or to abridge or condition the use of, or access to, any of
its facilities and services to any person otherwise qualified, wholly or partially,
for a discriminatory reason, based upon ... sexual orientation., 83 Georgetown
argued that the statute could not require it to recognize, fund, and provide
support to a gay and lesbian group. Any such application of the statute would
be compelled speech and a burden on the free exercise of religion, which are
both invalid under the First Amendment. These arguments prevailed in the
District's Superior Court, and the students appealed. 4
The seven judges who heard the appeal wrote seven different opinions.
The judgment of the District Court of Appeals was delivered by Judge Julia
Cooper Mack, who interpreted the Act to require Georgetown to provide the
gay and lesbian student groups with access and tangible benefits on the same
terms afforded other student groups but not to require it to grant official
university "recognition" to the gay and lesbian groups.85 The language of the
Human Rights Act does not inevitably suggest this interpretation, but Judge
Mack was reluctant to turn the statute's broad command into a story in which
the state "compel[s] a regulated party to express religious approval or
neutrality towards any group or individual," 6 for that would be jarringly
inconsistent with our society's commitment to freedom of religion and our
discomfort with state-compelled speech, as Georgetown had maintained. In the
context of Georgetown's religious as well as secular educational mission and
its plausible belief that recognition carried with it the implication of
endorsement, Mack read the statute to allow the Catholic institution some
discretion.
But not much. Judge Mack found the statutory focus to be on equality of
treatment and not equality of attitudes and, therefore, required Georgetown to
provide equal access and benefits to the gay and lesbian student groups, which
Georgetown had resisted on the same free exercise and speech grounds on
83. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2520 (1981); see also id. § 1-2501 (setting forth intent of Council).
84. See Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 3.
85. See id. at 4-39. Judge Mack delivered the judgment of the court, but no one else joined her
opinion. Chief Judge William Pryor and Judge Theodore Newman concurred in the judgment and in most
of Judge Mack's analysis. Judges John Ferren and John Terry concurred in that part of the judgment
requiring Georgetown to provide equal access and services and dissented from that part not requiring
recognition. Judges James Belson and Frank Nebeker concurred in the part of the judgment not requiring
recognition and dissented from that part requiring equal access and services. Hence, although only three
judges agreed with both parts of the judgment, there were five (of seven) votes for each part.
86. Id. at 21.
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which it had refused formal recognition. Still, the judge reasoned that once
Georgetown was relieved of the obligation to recognize the gay and lesbian
student groups, its free exercise and speech interests became less compelling.
Set against this consideration was the compelling societal interest in protecting
lesbian and gay students from tangible discrimination. In a remarkable survey
of the medical and sociological literature, Mack debunked antihomosexual
prejudices as unfounded and built a normative case for protecting the rights of
gays and lesbians.87
The dissenting opinions argued that this resolution was unprincipled.
Judges John Ferren and John Terry criticized Judge Mack's acceptance of a
regime that treated gay and lesbian student organizations differently from other
student organizations.8 To the extent that the court's statutory analysis was
inspired by its constitutional concerns, they maintained that university
recognition would not have been tantamount to endorsement and that
Georgetown's free exercise rights were not abridged. Conversely, Judges James
Belson and Frank Nebeker took the court to task for forcing Georgetown "to
subsidize activities by those groups that offend the religious beliefs to which
the university adheres."8 9 They found the state's intrusion into Georgetown's
religious freedom unjustified by the nondiscrimination policy, in part because
they believed that such discrimination was not as much of a social problem as
racial discrimination. Judge Nebeker, in a separate dissent, went further to
argue that there was "no factor favoring a state interest under the Act which
can be balanced against Georgetown's rights" because the "conduct inherent
in homosexual 'life-style' is felonious" under the District's sodomy statute."
To make his point, Nebeker attached three pictorial examples of "propaganda
used to announce dances and gatherings" among gay and lesbian students at
George Washington University.9'
Gay Rights Coalition illustrates our normative heterogeneity, and a strength
of Judge Mack's opinion is that it values the claims of both nomoi. The
Roman Catholic community in which the court found Georgetown is a world-
creating nomos, for it draws upon a common history and tradition within which
its members are educated and which provide the community "a sense of
direction of growth that is constituted as the individual and his community
work out the implications of their law"; it is a "strong community of common
obligations," and common "initiatory, celebratory, expressive, and
87. See id. at 30-38.
88. See id. at 46 (Ferren, J., joined by Terry, J., concurrng in pan and dissenting in pan)
89. Id. at 63 (Belson, J., joined by Nebekcr, J., concumng in part and dissenting in part); see aLso id
at 72 (Belson, J., joined by Nebeker, J., concurring in part and dissenung in pan)
90. Id. at 75 (Nebeker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in pan)- Recall Senator Nancy
Kassebaum's belief that sexual orientation discrimination is largely on the basis of conduct, not status See
supra text accompanying note 22.
91. Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d. at 75-78 (Nebeker J . concumng in pan and dissenting in pan)
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performative" discourse.92 The Catholic nomos teaches that homosexual
behavior is a sin. Although the Church offers "homosexuals" compassion as
people, it does not tolerate what it considers sinful actions.93 Georgetown
University, as part of the Catholic nomos, did not directly ostracize gay men,
lesbians, and bisexuals; it did oppose homosexual activity, however, and
refused to include groups within its institutions which it thought would
encourage such activity. Thus, the starting point for Mack's analysis was the
"deeply rooted doctrine that a constitutional issue is to be avoided if possible,"
and her opinion read the Human Rights Act "so as to avoid difficult and
sensitive constitutional questions concerning the scope of the First
Amendment," specifically its Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses.94
Yet Judge Mack's opinion also recognized the birthing of a new nomos:
the gay and lesbian community.95 Though multifariously different from the
Catholic Church, this community shares many of its nomic characteristics,
including common experiences that have engendered a shared framework of
thinking about a wide range of issues; formal organizations for reporting and
comparing those experiences, expressing group identity, and developing group
positions; and a collective commitment to implementing shared values in
people's lives. Like other nonreligious nomic communities, the gay
community's insularity is not protected by the Free Exercise Clause, but is
protected by the First Amendment's other guarantees of free speech,
association, and assembly. Potentially, the Equal Protection Clause shields gay,
lesbian, and bisexual communities, as vulnerable and unpopular minorities,
against arbitrary state intrusion, a point explicitly invoked by Judge Mack.96
She upheld the Human Rights Act requirement that Georgetown provide
facilities and services to the students, because the burden on the university's
free exercise and speech was justified by the compelling state interest in
ameliorating discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
The objections to Judge Mack's resolution are serious, however. Judge
Ferren charged that her interpretation of the statute "permits a 'separate but
92. Cover, supra note 6, at 12-13.
93. See The Vatican's Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, The Pastoral Care of Homosexual
Persons, 16 ORIGINs 377 (1986) (letter to Catholic Bishops, urging them to exclude from pastoral programs
organizations in which "homosexuals" participate "without clearly stating that homosexual activity is
immoral").
94. Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 16 (opinion of Mack, J.) (citing NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440
U.S. 490, 507 (1979) (refusing to interpret federal labor law to regulate employment conditions of lay
teachers at parochial schools)).
95. See id. at 31-38.
96. See id. at 37; see also Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated,
875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane) (holding sexual orientation to be "suspect" classification, in part
because gay people are politically vulnerable "discrete and insular minority") (quoting United States v.
Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)); Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487,499-500 (Ky.
1992) (applying Watkins's heightened scrutiny because homosexuals "'form virtually a discrete and insular
minority') (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIE, AMERICAN CONSTItUTIONAL LAw 1616 (2d ed. 1988)); Janet
E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity,
36 UCLA L. REv. 915 (1989) (discussing applicability of strict scrutiny to homosexuals).
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equal' access to university facilities reminiscent of the justification that once
permitted blacks on public buses, but only in the back." '97 Would the court
allow a fundamentalist Protestant college, such as Bob Jones University, to
refuse recognition to a student group that favored interracial dating and
marriage, practices that are antithetical to Bob Jones's interpretation of the
Bible? Would such action not be simple race discrimination that would justify
the incidental burdens on free speech and expression? The 1983 Supreme
Court decision in Bob Jones University v. United States' supports Ferren's
argument. There, a near-unanimous Court interpreted the Internal Revenue
Code to strip Bob Jones of its exemption as a charitable institution because the
school discriminated on the basis of race in admissions and internal student
affairs. Bob Jones argued that its underlying policy, the prohibition of
interracial dating, was mandated by its fundamentalist religious beliefs. The
Court assumed that Bob Jones's free exercise of religion was substantially
burdened but unanimously rejected the constitutional attack because the burden
served the "fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination
in education-discrimination that prevailed, with official approval, for the first
165 years of this Nation's constitutional history."'99 Precisely the same point
could be made in the Georgetown case: Burdens on the university's free
exercise of religion serve the fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating
sexual orientation discrimination in education-discrimination that prevailed,
with official approval, for most of this century.
Judge Belson charged that Judge Mack's interpretation forced a Catholic
institution to support students in sacrilegious advocacy and pornography. Judge
Nebeker's pictures feature substantially naked men with lewd expressions."
According to Belson, this was not just a burden on free expression and the
exercise of faith; it was state direction to church officials to violate their faith.
He argued that "Georgetown has a free speech" and a free exercise "right not
to endorse or subsidize the groups' promotion of ideas with which it
disagrees," particularly when that disagreement is a matter of well-documented
religious faith.'0 ' His argument is supported by the Supreme Court's decision
in Wooley v. Maynard,02 where the Court held that the First Amendment
prevented New Hampshire from requiring a Jehovah's Witness couple to
97. Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 49 (Ferren, I.. dissenting in pan) As I explain later in this Pan.
the more precise race analogy would be the "'with all deliberate speed" directive for school desegregation
in Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown If)
98. 461 U.S. 574 (1983); see also PHILIP B HEYiANN & LANCh Lthlmv. Ti.H Lt.AL
RESPONSIBILTY OF LAWYERS: CASE STUDIES 139 (1988) (providing background of Bob Jones policies).
Cover, supra note 6, at 63-68 (criticizing Court's decision in Bob Jones)
99. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 604.
100. See Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 76-78 (Nebeker. J . concurrng in pan and dissenting in
part).
101. See id. at 68 (Belson, J., dissenting in pan); see also id at 71-72 (Belson. J , dissenting in part)
(making same point regarding free exercise right).
102. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
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display the state motto, "Live Free or Die," on the license plate of their car.
Because the state measure "force[d] an individual, as part of his daily life...
to be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of
view he finds unacceptable," it implicated core First Amendment interests,
0 3
whose sacrifice was hardly justified by the administrative (traffic control) and
ideological (state pride) reasons advanced by the state. t°4 So, too, in the
Georgetown case, the state measure forced a Roman Catholic institution and
its priests, as part of their daily lives, to be an instrument for fostering public
adherence to an ideological point of view they found unacceptable and contrary
to their religious tradition.
The common ground for Judges Mack, Ferren, and Belson was that two
norms (nondiscrimination and free exercise/speech) were colliding, and their
collision reflected two nomic communities in fundamental conflict. The judges
differed over how best to resolve disputes among those colliding norms and
how to calibrate the legal entitlements of the clashing groups. Only Judge
Mack conceded that the precedents did not resolve the case for the court.
Authorities like Wooley demonstrated that the case implicated Georgetown's
free speech and free expression, but authorities like Bob Jones demonstrated
that reducing historical discrimination was a compelling state interest that
could justify some burdens on First Amendment interests. Both Wooley, where
the state interests were so weak, and Bob Jones, where the state interest of
reducing racial discrimination was exceptionally important, were easier cases
than Georgetown's case, however.'0 5
The most striking aspect of Judge Mack's opinion is its avoidance of
traditional rights discourse and its focus instead on community needs and
103. Id. at 715.
104. See id. at 716-17. The Wooley rule against forced speech was derived from West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), which held that school children cannot be required
to pledge allegiance to the flag if the pledge is inconsistent with their religious belief, and was applied in
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities, 475 U.S. 1 (1986), to prevent the state from requiring a
public utility to act as a conduit for an ideological message with which it disagreed.
105. Bob Jones poses the greater challenge to Judge Mack's position, because Mack joined Judge
Newman's concurring opinion, which found the District's interest in eliminating sexual orientation
discrimination no less important than the compelling, and quasiconstitutional, interest in eliminating racial
discrimination. See Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 46 (Newman, J., concurring). Because Judges Ferren
and Terry also joined that part of Judge Newman's opinion, that part was the only reasoning that
commanded a majority (four of seven) of the en bane court. This presented Judge Mack with a dilemma.
Probably, she would have required Georgetown (or a Bob Jones-like university) to recognize an African-
American student group and would have overridden free exercise objections. But if fighting sexual
orientation discrimination is just as compelling a state policy as fighting racial discrimination, as Mack and
three colleagues expressly held, why should a university be able to escape recognizing a sexual orientation-
based group, when it would have to recognize a race-based group notwithstanding religious objections?
One way to resolve Judge Mack's dilemma would be to read Bob Jones narrowly. Cover, supra note
6, criticizes the Court's decision for disrespecting the religious community without taking stronger
responsibility for the act of jurispathy. See also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP B. FRICKEY, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 826-28 (2d ed. 1995).
Notably, the decision has not been applied by the Court to restrict nomic community in other contexts and
may be a constitutional outlier.
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nomic interests. Rather than speaking accusatorially of the "violation" of
Georgetown's free exercise "rights," or of Georgetown's violation of the
students' rights of "full citizenship" and association in the university
community, as did her dissenting brethren, Mack discussed the "burden ... on
Georgetown's religious exercise," and the "interest" of the larger community
in eliminating discrimination based on sexual orientation." 6 In her treatment
of the colliding norms-free speech/free exercise of religion versus
nondiscrimination-Mack's opinion was even more distinct from those of her
brethren, for she was open to long-submerged voices while also seeking
reasonable accommodation of their needs. Analyzing the District's interest in
nondiscrimination, amply revealed in the legislative history, Mack subjected
the Council's findings to independent but sympathetic examination in light of
the history of society's understanding of homosexuality. She expanded the
record to consider information about the benign nature of sexual variation, the
needless persecution of gay men and lesbians, and the ways in which such
persecution demeans the whole political community.'"'
While Judge Mack's accommodationist approach is subject to the charge
that she was just splitting the difference for political rather than principled
reasons, the approach can pragmatically be defended as Solomonic. Elsewhere,
I have praised this approach to colliding norms by appealing to feminist and
republican theories of law."~ Here, I appreciate her approach and her
resolution from the perspective of a gaylegal jurisprudence. Reading my
account of the debate within the court, the reader might be surprised that the
Gay Rights Coalition argued for the Mack position, not for the Ferren position.
There were strategic considerations involved in the students' arguments, °
106. Gay Rights Coalition. 536 A.2d at 31 (opinion of Mack. J.) Compare id (opinion of Mack. J ).
with id. at 56-60 (Ferren, J., dissenting in part) (emphasizing students' rights to "full citizenship" in
university community as guaranteed by Human Rights Act), and id at 67-74 (Belson. J . disscntng in pan
(repeating focus on Georgetown's "rights" and evils of state "compulsion"). and id at 75 (Ncbekcr. J.
dissenting in part) (raising similar arguments). For a detailed statement of Judge Mack's position. see also
id. at 30-39 (opinion of Mack, J.).
107. See id. at 33-38 (opinion of Mack, J.).
108. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 81, at 185-92. For discussion of the development of feminist and
republican jurisprudence, see Man J. Matsuda, Pragmatsm Modified and the False Consctousness Problem.
63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1763 (1990); Mar J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as
Jurisprudential Method, II WOMEN's RTS. L. REt'. 7 (1989); Frank Michelman. Las, 's Republic. 97 YALE
L.J. 1493 (1988); Martha Minow, The Supreme Court. 1986 Ternn-Foreisord" Justice Engendered. 101
HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987); Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist. i PA'GmATsm v4 I..AW
AND SocIETY 127 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991); and Judith Resnik. On the Bias Femmit
Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for Our Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REV 1877 (1988)
109. Vacating the panel opinion by Judge Ferren, with Judge Mack in partial disscnt, the Court of
Appeals agreed to hear the case en bane without even waiting for a motion from Georgetown This was
a signal that there was not a court majority for the Ferren position, and there were good strategic reasons
for the students to tack to new winds. According to Lori Jean (one of two lead student plaintiffs) and the
students' attorney, Richard Gross, the plaintiffs were originally reluctant to argue the Mack position but
were persuaded to do so because there was no other way to win the case See GULC/Bi-LAGA Oral
History of Gay Rights Coalition, Interview Tapes for Loni Jean (Aug 8. 1991) and Richard Gross (Sept
15, 1991). They were ultimately delighted that her position prevailed
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but in my view they reflected jurisprudential insights of the gay experience as
well. Inspired by the many lessons of the coming-out experience, gaylegal
jurisprudence, as I would articulate it, provides ideas that help reconcile the
colliding commitments of our polity to both equality and liberty, to
nondiscrimination, free exercise, and free speech.
B. Coming Out of the Closet: A Linguistic Archaeology
The political precepts and phenomenological claims by which Judge Mack
defended the District's compelling concern with sexual orientation
discrimination merit further exploration. An implication of the District's
Human Rights Act is that lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals ought to be able
to "come out of the closet" at school, in public accommodations, and in the
workplace. The morphogenesis of the phrase "coming out of the closet" tells
much about the history of homosexuality in this century and is a useful prelude
to deriving legal insights from it. Perhaps surprisingly, the phrase itself is a
historically recent conflation of two different but related terms, "coming out"
and "the closet," both of which assumed politicized and sexualized meanings
after World War II.
Homosexual activity has been secretive this entire century, and the closet
has long been a metaphor for secrecy,"0 but it was not until mid-century that
the closet became such a key metaphor for the secrecy entailed in sexuality,
especially deviant sexuality. An early example is John Home Bums's Lucifer
with a Book, a novel about budding sexuality in a New England boys'
school."' Homosexuality is nowhere explicit, but its force saturates the
novel. The central character, instructor Guy Hudson, is a scarred war hero of
intense but ambiguous sexuality; he is an erotic magnet attracting both students
and colleagues, women and men, promiscuous and prim alike, but the only
clue as to his own sexuality is a lewd but ambiguous Renaissance print he
keeps in his dormitory closet." 2 Other characters pry into the closet to
glimpse that sexuality,"' and this ultimately contributes to Hudson's expulsion
from the school.' 4 The probable cultural reference is to the idea of deviant
110. Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis wrote of the press's ability to assure that "what is whispered
in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops." Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right
to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 195 (1890).
111. JOHN HORNE BURNS, LUctFER WrrH A BOOK (1949).
112. The etching kept in the closet was of three people writhing in sexual ecstasy. The implication
is that a blond man is deriving sexual pleasure from intercourse with both a man and a woman. See id. at
105-06.
113. Ralph DuBochet, a student attracted to Hudson, forms an ambiguous link with Hudson when he
surprises him looking at the closeted etching, see id., but Hudson rebuffs further efforts at intimate
connection by refusing to "uncloset" the etching to Ralph again, see id. at 132-33.
114. When the school turns militarist under the leadership of a bachelor professor who is fascinated
with and repelled by Hudson's closet, and of a stormtrooper student who tries to penetrate Hudson's closet
in a clumsy seduction attempt, they turn on the man who rebuffed them. The bachelor professor even
invades Hudson's closet and exposes his polymorphous sexuality.
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sexuality as a "skeleton in the closet," a connection explicitly made in the
1950s." 5 By the 1960s, homosexuals who were completely secretive about
their sexual preferences or experiences were known as "closet queens" (men)
and "lace curtains" (women).1 6 As a metaphor for homosexuality in
particular, and perhaps sexuality more generally, the closet combined themes
of secrecy, shame, and mystery.
The concept of "coming out" has a different history and a multiplicity of
homophile meanings. One was entry into gay subculture, like the "coming out"
of a debutante entering into society. "'I've been invited to a faggot party,"'
matinee idol Ronald Shaw told Jim Willard in Gore Vidal's The City and the
Pillar. "'I'll take you. It can be your coming-out party in New York."'. 7
Vidal used the term broadly, to connote any activity through which one
associated oneself with the subculture, but by the late 1950s the term had a
more specialized meaning in some circles: one's first intimate experience with
someone of the same sex, a kind of baptism into gay society."' A man
might realize he is gay and hang around with homosexuals, but he had not
"come out" until he had sex with another man.
By the 1960s, some gay people were using "coming out" as an expression
for the homosexual's sharing her or his own private disapproved identity, his
or her "skeleton in the closet," with people not known to be homosexual."'
By then, the closet had become a metonym for what one writer called "the
absolute necessity for secrecy from the majority (which, immediately, included
your family and the police, but also all other heterosexuals) regarding the truth
of your sexuality,"'" and coming out connoted one's willingness to share
this secret with outsiders: "You, as a homosexual, know that your 'coming out'
115. For a later reference to homosexuality as a "'private skel ton in the closet." see Marlin Prenisa.
Are Homosexuals Security Risks?, ONE, INC., Dec 1955, at 4
116. Michelle Duloc & Rene Autil, Fluff, Buff. and Butch: Spy vs Spy ii Yourself. VFC'TOR. July
1968, at 11; see also Samuel R. Delany. Coming/Out. in BOYS LIKE US: GAY WRITERS TELL THEIR
COMING OUT STORIES 1, 14 (Patrick Merla ed., 1996) (explaining that "closet queens" were men who
enjoyed fact that their families and friends did not know of their deviant sexuality)
A competing metaphor for the closet was the masquerade See. e g. Lisa Ben. Masquerade. VICE
VERSA, Oct. 1947, reprinted in LADDER, OCt. 1958, at 6-10. 26-29 Sharing one's secret orientation with
others was considered discarding or taking off the mask See, e.g. Bob Bishop, Discard the Mask.
MAITrACHINE REv., Apr. 1958, at 14-16, 21-24. The closet metaphor dtd not ovetake the mask metaphor
until the 1960s.
117. GORE VIDAL, THE CITY AND THE PILLAR 172 (rev ed 1965) The quotation in the text is from
the novel as revised by Vidal. The original 1948 edition read "You can come with me if you want to
You'll meet most of the prominent ones in town; I think it'd be fun" GORE VIDAL, THE CITY AND THE
PILLAR 233 (1948).
118. See. e.g.. Delany. supra note 116. at 13; Andrew Holleran. Metnones of Heidelberg, in BoYs
LIKE Us. supra note 116, at 88, 97.
119. See Barbara Stephens. The Coming Out of Marros. LADDER. May 1958. at 14-16. 25-26 Roger
Austen refers to John Home Bums's statement, apparently made dunng the 1950s. that writing Lucifer ith
a Book reflected Bums's decision to "come out of the cloister" Unfortunately. Austen provides no
reference or precise date for this quotation. See ROGER AUSTEN, PLAYING THE GAME TiE- HOMOSEXUAL
NOVEL IN AMERICA 110 (1977).
120. A.E. Smith, Coming Out, ONE, INC., June 1962, at 6. 7
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changed your whole life. It was like coming out of a cocoon. The world
thereafter to you was a whole new world....' That many homosexuals felt
an impulse to "come out" in the early 1960s reflected a shift in the culture of
the closet, either a reduction in its shame or a determination that personal
integrity outweighed the shame. Nonetheless, before 1969, it was just as likely
that the homosexual would be cast out of the closet by the police state as by
his or her own free will. To fight against "homosexual recruiting of youth," for
example, Florida's Legislative Investigation Committee wrote in 1964, "the
closet door must be thrown open and the light of public understanding cast
upon homosexuality."'22
Yet because sexuality was perceived as a personal truth, and because the
closet was considered suffocating, gay people did increasingly share their
secrets in the 1960s. They did so not just for reasons of personal integrity or
emotional survival, but as a collective strategy for fighting anti-gay laws. As
Ernestine Eckstein, Vice President of the New York Chapter of Daughters of
Bilitis put it, "[h]omosexuals are invisible, except for the stereotypes, and I
feel homosexuals have to become visible and to assert themselves politically
... . They have to come out on behalf of the cause and accept whatever
consequences come.' '123 As lesbians and gays came to realize that their
political survival depended upon open protests against antihomosexual policies,
they urged closet queens and lace curtains to "[c]ome out, come out wherever
you are ... preferably to the open door of the S.I.R. Center," a San Francisco
gay rights group."
The gay liberation that followed the Stonewall riots of June 1969 saw
"coming out of the closet" congeal into the catch phrase of a generation.2 5
Building upon the "gay is good" features of the 1960s homophile movement,
the Stonewall generation not only definitively associated coming out with the
destruction of the closet, but also deepened and transformed the meaning of the
particular phenomenon. Coming out as lesbian, gay, or bisexual now is viewed
as telling outsiders, not just insiders, about one's sexual identity. It no longer
is understood merely as a discrete personal discov, ery and expression of one's
sexuality, but is now seen as a process of continual discovery and exploration
121. Id.
122. FLORIDA LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATION COMM., HOMOSEXUALITY AND CITIZENSHIP IN FLORIDA
14 (1964). Earlier in the report, the Committee quoted an investigator, who said:
"Since the homosexual has seen fit to come out into the open and get himself accepted by
society, I think it is about time that thinking members of society ... realize that if we don't
stand up and start fighting, we are going to lose these battles in a very real war of morality."
Id. For a poignant example of this phenomenon from the South of the 1950s, see Allan Gurganus, He s
One, Too, in BOYS LIKE Us, supra note 116, at 40, 40-72.
123. Kay Tobin & Barbara Gittings, Interview with Ernestine [Eckstein], LADDER, June 1966, at 4,
9; see also James Colton, The Homosexual Identity, LADDER, Sept. 1968, at 4-8.
124. Duloc & Autil, supra note 116, at 11.
125. See, e.g., OUT OF THE CLOSETS: VOICES OF GAY LIBERATION (Karla Jay & Allen Young eds.,
1972).
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made possible through liberation from the clichds of "compulsory
heterosexuality."'" No longer a debutante's entry into the society of
deviance, coming out is now viewed in quasi-religious terms, like being "born
again" or baptized into a society that is spiritual as well as physical." z Most
important, coming out is an act of community, through which the uncloseted
individual both joins a subculture and becomes an ambassador at large of that
subculture as well. The post-Stonewall understanding of coming out of the
closet has implications for American law as well as culture.
C. A Jurisprudence of Coining Out as a Source of Legal Principles
The foregoing account helps to situate the Georgetown case both
historically and jurisprudentially. The students' desire to form a campus group
was an effort to oppose the sexual closet at all levels. Students would find a
supportive group as they struggled with issues of their sexuality; a lesbian and
gay nomos would be established at Georgetown, one that was linked to the
larger subculture thriving in the District of Columbia; and gay political power
would be asserted against the shame of the closet. In the 1950s and 1960s, the
students' individual and collective coming out would have been the object of
state persecution in the District. By the 1970s and 1980s it was the object of
explicit state support: the Human Rights Act. In the 1950s and 1960s,
Georgetown could remain on the sidelines, silently going along with the state-
sanctioned "apartheid of the closet." By the 1970s, Georgetown was involved
against its will, and in the 1980s it was subjected to a court order that it felt
trenched on both religious and expressive liberties that its lawyers insisted
were protected by the First Amendment.
Coming out as an intellectual phenomenon also helps us think about the
Georgetown case at a more general level. As Eve Sedgwick has argued,
coming out of the closet is a metaphor that transcends homosexuality."3 For
example, it is possible for someone to come out as a fat person, and an openly
gay person can still be in the closet about his HIV status, attraction to children,
or leather fantasies. Sedgwick maintains that the closet has become a reigning
metaphor for sexuality and knowledge. The phenomenology of coming out has
distinct metaphorical possibilities for thinking about issues of law. Specifically,
there is a jurisprudence suggested by the coming-out experience that can
126. The term originated in Adrienne Rich, Compulory Hoinosexualhn" and Lesbian Eratsence, in
POWERS OF DESIRE: THE POLmTCs OF SEXUALITY 177 (Ann Snitow ct al eds. 1983) The point in the text
reflects women's different experience in particular. Although lesbians contrbuted to the "coming-out
discourse," see supra notes 116, 123, 125, it was primanly a male discourse descnbing gay and bisexual
men's experience. Women's experience of sexual self-identity has tended to be more Iluid or gradual and
less act-oriented than that of men. See James T. Sears, The Inpact of Gender and Race on Grosi ang Up
Lesbian and Gay in the South, I NAT'L WOMEN'S STUD Ass'N J 422. 437 (1989)
127. See, e.g., Dennis Hunter, The Cure, in BoYs LIKE Us. supra note 116. at 284. 292
128. See SEDGWICK, supra note 27. at 72; 3ee also Yoshmo. 3upra note 35, at 1794-802
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generate ideas relevant to the collision of liberty and equality norms in cases
like Gay Rights Coalition. Although the ideas suggested by my reading of the
coming-out experience are not unique to gaylaw, they are distinctive to it, and
to the extent they are consonant with precepts drawn from other sources, such
as feminism, their persuasive power is thereby increased.
1. The Value of Identity Speech and Some Asymmetries
Once a culture has elevated one personal trait to the level of an identity
characteristic, that characteristic becomes socially relevant. When a socially
relevant trait such as sexuality or religion is not immediately apparent, the
individual runs the risk of deceiving others-or of losing social, economic, or
political opportunities-if she or he does not reveal her identity, usually
through expression ("I am a lesbian") or expressive conduct (sporting a pink
triangle). The value of identity speech is greatest for the minority. The person
whose trait is widely shared need not say anything, for her correct identity will
be presumed in the absence of rebuttal. Indeed, most of the time it will
unconsciously be presumed both by the person and her interlocutors. For the
minority person, the identity trait will loom larger. Unfortunately, it is both
more important and much harder for her to self-identify.
Self-identification for a gay person is particularly important because, left
uncorrected, the default assumption of "normalcy" will create a misleading
basis for her relations with others, and because disclosing her actual sexual
orientation offers the possibility of forging deeper connections with other
minority members, visible and invisible alike. Self-identification is also much
harder for her, because she must then fear the disapproval or ostracism of the
majority. This is the dilemma of the closet: The closet is a temptingly safe
hiding place, but it forecloses psychological, social, and political opportunities.
The closet diminishes not only the integrity of its denizens, but also their
mental health. Those bearing socially disapproved identity traits tend to
internalize society's disapproval. A wide variety of psychologists have found
that internalized homophobia, in particular, obstructs the development of an
emotionally healthy life for the gay person, and that the best-adjusted gay
individuals have gone through a process of "acceptance and appreciation" of
their sexual identity. 29 Virtually every coming-out story is a story of relief
that its teller can feel honest about herself and free to make her life good.
129. John C. Gonsiorek & James R. Rudolph, Homosexual Identity: Coming Out and Other
Developmental Events, in HOMOSEXUALrrY, supra note 76, at 161 (surveying psychological literature and
setting forth model of healthy psychological development that depends on gay person's comfort); see also
J. Schippers, Gay Affirmative Counseling and Psychotherapy in the Netherlands (1990) (unpublished
manuscript) (noting that "acceptance and appreciation process" better captures the coming to terms with
gay self-identity, especially for lesbians, than "coming out"), discussed in id. at 169.
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Homosexual self-identification is also crucial for the formation of a lesbian
and gay nomos, consisting of discernibly gay history, institutions, and mores,
and is essential to gay political power as well. The gay experience reinforces
the feminist idea that the personal is political; coming out of the closet as a
gay person is also an explicitly political act. 3 The anonymity of closeted
homosexuals in the 1950s was key to their political marginalization and
contributed to antihomosexual stereotypes; because folks did not realize that
their friends and family were gay, they were more likely to believe that
homosexuals were lonely, psychopathic, and dysfunctional. 3 ' The closet also
disabled gay people from forming social and political groups. Hence
homophobes were able to persecute gay people virtually at will, without
political or social repercussion. Only after a significant number of gay people
came out-or were cast out--of the closet did the polity let up on persecuting
gays generally, in response to organized gay pressure groups and noisy social
activism."'
Consider this final twist. Once minorities become more salient through
identity speech, the majority has an incentive to speak too. Minority speech
destabilizes the norm, which then loses its social invisibility. At that point,
individuals or groups in the majority will speak out, to assert or reassert their
identity. Typically, there will still be an asymmetry, as the majority will tend
to self-identify in negative rather than positive ways. Rather than saying, "We
are good old-fashioned heterosexuals," the majority will say things like, "I'm
no pansy," or "Those people are sick," or "Our way of life is threatened." Note
the irony. In the regime of the closet, the "deviant" views herself in a negative
way, as "not normal." Once the closet door flies open and former "deviants"
proclaim themselves normal, many in the mainstream initially find themselves
in a state of denial (no, those "queers" are not normal), and many of the
deniers will root their identity more explicitly in what they are not.
2. The Social Costs of Suppressing Identity Speech: Per'ersion of
Identity, Empowerment of the Vicious, and Social Anger
Suppression of identity speech is harmful at three distinct social levels: It
undermines the flourishing of individuals, their nomic communities, and the
polity itself. At the first level, identity speech suppression places citizens in a
double bind in which they can either lie and sacrifice their personal integrity,
130. See Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel Co. 595 P2d 592. 610-11 (Cal 1979)
(holding that self-identity of gay people is "political expresston" under California law)
131. See Colton, supra note 123, at 4-5.
132. See Eskridge, supra note 4; see also BARRY D, AtA.M. THE Rish O- A GAY ANt) LhsBLA'N
MOVEMENT (1987); Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carolcne Products. 98 HARv L Riv 713. 719-21 (1985)
(discussing special organizational problems faced by "anonymous" and sugmatized miontis)
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or speak out and feel the wrath of authority.'33 Each choice entails
psychological pain or dysfunction for those censored. If the person admits her
sexual orientation, she faces potentially paralyzing social ostracism and
professional ruin; if she conceals her sexual orientation, she will be stunting
and perhaps even destroying her psychological development. Living a lie by
outwardly conforming to compulsory heterosexuality harms those living it by
giving their lives a mark of inauthenticity, disrupting their relationships with
others, and hurting those whom they marry or otherwise implicate in the
lie. 34 The double bind may work even worse than that, as the censored
individual often lies for awhile and then is destroyed when the truth somehow
escapes.'35 The suffocating effects of the closet are illustrated by exceedingly
high suicide rates for bisexual and gay teenagers'36 and by the loneliness and
anomie depicted in autobiographical or even fictional accounts of unfulfilled
lives.137 The worst creatures of the closet are the individuals who triumph
over the censorship by becoming supercensors, trumping accusations of illegal
identity with counteraccusations of their own. Joe McCarthy, J. Edgar Hoover,
and Roy Cohn were such demons of the closet.
138
Suppression of identity speech may have social consequences, as it
potentially inhibits or distorts the flourishing of nomic communities. A nomos
is a chain of interlocking identities, linked to the past by stories of struggle and
identification. The lesbian and gay nomos is one marked by the recognition by
each new generation that its members feel attraction to persons of the same
133. On the double bind, see SEDOWICK, supra note 27, at 69-71; and Janet Halley, The Construction
of Heterosexuality, in FEAR OF A QUEER PLANET: QUEER POLITICS AND SOCIAL THEORY 82, 82-99
(Michael Warner ed., 1993).
134. On the price of the double bind to human beings thus stigmatized, and their partners, see BRUCE
BAWER, A PLACE AT THE TABLE: THE GAY INDIVIDUAL IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 106-07 (1993); LAUD
HUMPHREYS, OUT OF THE CLOSETS: THE SOCIOLOGY OF HOMOSEXUAL LIBERATION (1972); Linda Garnets
et al., Violence and Victimization of Lesbians and Gay Men: Mental Health Consequences, in HATE CRIMES
207 (Gregory M. Herek & Kevin T. Berrill eds., 1992); Sue Kiefer Hammersmith & Martin Weinberg,
Homosexual Identity: Commitment, Adjustment, and Significant Others, 36 SOcIOMETRY 56 (1973); and
Gregory M. Herek, Stigma, Prejudice, and Violence Against Lesbians and Gay Men, in HOMOSEXUALITY,
supra note 76, at 60. See generally GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1954) (discussing
destructive effect of prejudice on its objects).
135. For the most fascinating legal examples, see Rowland v. Mad River Local School District, 730
F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1009 (1985); and Acanfora v. Board of Education of
Montgomery County, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974).
136. See Paul Gibson, Gay and Lesbian Youth Suicide, in U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.
YOUTH SUICIDE REPORT 110 (1989) (explaining how social stigma of homosexuality and lack of support
from families and peers lead directly to high suicide rates for lesbian and gay adolescents).
137. See, e.g., JAMES BALDWIN, GIOVANNI'S ROOM (1956); LILLIAN HELLMAN, THE CHILDREN'S
HOUR (1934).
138. Cohn was clearly a gay man, see NICHOLAS VON HOFFMAN, CITIZEN COHN (1988), and the
bachelor Senator Joseph McCarthy operated under that suspicion, which he sought to allay by marrying
his longtime assistant, Jean Kerr, in 1953, see DAVID M. OSHINSKY, A CONSPIRACY SO IMMENSE: THE
WORLD OF JOE MCCARTHY 310-11, 328-29 (1983). There is substantial but unverified evidence that J.
Edgar Hoover was a cross-dressing homosexual married for 40 years to his best friend and deputy, Clyde
Tolson. See ANTHONY SUMMERS, OFFICIAL AND CONFIDENTIAL: THE SECRET LIFE OF J. EDGAR HOOVER
(1993). It is clear that Tolson and Hoover shared an emotional intimacy and association without any other
close parallel in Hoover's life.
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sex, and that these new personal narratives relate to those of the previous
generation as well as those of the new generation. In this century, the
American state has sought to disrupt the lesbian and gay nonios for its
deviance, but the gay experience has been that censorship more readily
perverts than destroys. This was also the consequence of Bismarck's anti-
Catholic Kulturkampf. State persecution stiffened the resistance of German
Catholics, and made them more determined to preserve their culture. 3 When
a state seeks to destroy a nomos, its legacy can be anger or a hardening of
identity or a politicizing of a previously unorganized group.
Even when the state campaign is more successful, its legacy tends to be
a nomos of fear and hiding. Consider this parallel. Between 1391 and 1478,
powerful popular and political forces in Spain sought to erase Judaism in an
early example of Kulturkampf.'40 Although attacks on the Jews impelled
many to convert to Christianity, these forced conversions perverted Spain as
well as its Christianity. The "Old Christians" never trusted the "New
Christians." The Inquisition, a national calamity, was invited to Spain to root
out Jewish practices among the con versos. Although Jewish nomic identity was
diminished, it was not publicly erased until the Jews' expulsion from Spain in
1492. Even after 1492, Judaic tradition survived among the "secret Jews,"
Marranos who passed as Catholic but continued to practice their religion
notwithstanding the Inquisition.' 4' Today, centuries after the Inquisition and
after their families fled Spain, a few Marranos remain "closeted," ostensible
Catholics who maintain their Jewish heritage. Something culturally good is lost
when fine people live in such fear of nonconformity, and something culturally
dangerous is instantiated if the majority's values become universal by force
rather than persuasion.
Admittedly, we would all be better off without some nomic communities.
One problem is making the correct choices. The bad nomoi on my list (private
militias) are not on yours (liberal academia). Another difficulty is that a
campaign of identity suppression may have the effect of reinforcing the
identity it is trying to suppress. Not only is it futile for the state to tell us who
we can be, but the state's telling also helps mold a coherent identity for some
of those lectured. The best example of that process is America's first full-
fledged effort to censor homosexual identity. During World War II, the United
States sought to identify homosexual recruits so that they could be excluded
from military service. The interrogations "discovered" few homosexuals, but
139. See SMITH, supra note 11, at 42-47.
140. See generally NETANYAHU, supra note 30
141. The story of the "secret Jews" is told in TRUDI ALEXY, THF MEI.r.AH L€ TH. MADONNA'S FOOT
253-92 (1993), and is discussed in Chai R. Fcldblum, Sexual Orientanon. MAoralh)". and the Lais Dri'hn
Revisited, 57 U. PrrT. L. REV. 237, 327-30 (1996) The Alexy account is anecdotal and should be
discounted by the scholarship of Benzion Netanyahu. who demonstrates that most Mararino abandoned
their Jewish faith and that very few "secret Jews" remained in Spain when the lnqusition was establtshed
in 1482. See NETANYAHU, supra note 30, at xvii-xx,.
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thousands were first alerted to their possible homosexual orientation by the
official quizzing. 142 Both stigmatized and traumatized by state interrogations
and occasional witch hunts, the closeted homosexuals in the armed forces
formed clandestine subcultures under the noses of the military's psychiatric
gendarmerie.
The destruction of the lives of individuals and the creation of secret nomoi
without good cause are morally wrong. What counts as "good cause" is a point
of contest. Intolerant priests in the fifteenth century thought Spanish Jews were
an irritant to Spanish society; Bismarck thought Roman Catholics impeded the
formation of a national social and political culture; Senator Edmunds thought
that Mormons threatened the family and, with it, the state; politicians during
the McCarthy era thought homosexuals both immoral and subversive (subject
to blackmail). In all these instances-the classic Kulturkampfs-groups were
vilified by reference to their affront to popular feelings and without any
showing that they harmed other people. Such speculative and usually
makeweight harm cannot justify Kulturkampf, either as a matter of social
justice or, in the United States, of the First Amendment's protection of nomic
pluralism. 43 Even when society is justified in suppressing a nomos, it needs
to consider the harms engendered by the process of suppression. As a political
matter, censorship is unhealthy in two different ways. On the one hand, by
expending so much social effort in hunting and hiding, the state is squandering
valuable human resources that could be used more productively. At the very
level of two-person cooperation, when one person feels she has to be guarded
and secretive about herself, the whole enterprise of cooperation will be
compromised, if only a little. Multiplied manifold, this social loss is very
significant.
On the other hand, suppression creates unnecessary risks for a society,
especially the possibility of a malignant dynamic of anger, as it raises the
stakes of clashing nomic communities. When the state makes it a crime to
express oneself as a Jew, as a lover of Africans, or as a homosexual, the state
is likely to embitter the objects of the suppression and to empower its own
worst bigots. As to the latter, the person who is most likely to enforce rules
of suppression is someone who feels the most intense animosity toward the
targeted class, often people who themselves resent being members of the class.
By empowering such people, the state is giving its most potentially vicious
citizens power over its most vulnerable. This is not only cruel but
counterproductive, as it creates resistance among the vulnerable, and even
anger that can spill over into violence. By demonizing a vibrant nomic
142. See ALLAN BgRUB-, COMING OUT UNDER FIRE: THE HISTORY OF GAY MEN AND WOMEN IN
WORLD WAR Two (1990).
143. The First Amendment even protects the Ku Klux Klan from Kulturkampf, unless its members
tangibly harm other people, see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), and sometimes even then, see
R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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community, the state is inviting social turmoil. Kulturkampf is politically
destructive as well as morally squalid.
3. The Connection Betveen Private Discrimination and Public
Censorship
The main lesson suggested by the experience of the closet and the impulse
to come out is the value of uncloseted identity speech. Suppressing such
expression generates horrendous costs and should be avoided if possible. Gay
experience suggests the many ways identity expression can be suppressed. A
minority identity can be silenced by direct prohibition or by indirect threat of
losing promised benefits, by pain of criminal sanction or of civil penalties, and
by private as well as public sources of power. Generally, the jurisprudence of
coming out reinforces the interconnection between the anticensorship and
nondiscrimination principles suggested by the religion cases. Specifically,
identity is just as easily closeted by private discrimination as it is by public
censorship. Consider how they relate in the Georgetown case.
The case involved two different kinds of identity-speech claims, both
treated in Judge Mack's opinion. Georgetown argued that it was
discriminating, if at all, only on the basis of the students' expression and not
their sexual orientation.'" Because only the latter was forbidden by the
Human Rights Act, the university maintained that the former was legal. Judge
Mack properly rejected this argument. Lesbians and gays are discriminated
against by being forced into a closet; hence, claims of discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation and censorship on the basis of sexual expression
merged in the Georgetown case. Indeed, nondiscrimination cases usually
involve this kind of relationship. Discrimination on the basis of identity is a
way of undermining a nornos, and prohibiting such discrimination limits the
ability of institutions to censor their members' expression through their politics
of presence.
Georgetown also argued that requiring it to recognize the gay student
groups would be censorship of its identity as a Catholic-affiliated institution.
By refusing to recognize the gay groups, Georgetown was expressing its
identity as an institution supporting Roman Catholic values and that faith's
intellectual tradition. This claim is admissible. If (indeed, because) the gay
students wanted to express their identity and connection with larger lesbian and
gay culture, Georgetown wanted to express its identity as a Roman Catholic
institution. Forcing Georgetown to recognize the gay student groups could
144. Note that if Georgetown were a public university subject to the First Amendment but not an
antidiscrimination law, it would probably have denied it was excluding the gay group because of the
students' expression and contended that it was only considenng their sexual orientation and its associated
behavior. See Gay Liberation v. University of Missouri. 558 F.2d 848 (8th Cir 1977), Gay Students Org
of Univ. of N.H. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652 (Ist Cir. 1974).
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create the same sort of masquerade-a phony identity-that compulsory
heterosexuality forces upon lesbian, gay, and bisexual people.
45
Identity-speech values therefore cut both ways in the Georgetown case.
How should a judge resolve the cross-cutting claims? A facile answer would
be that, because the Constitution just regulates state action, only the District's
censorship of Georgetown's identity, and not Georgetown's censorship of the
students' identity, implicates the constitutional commitment to anticensorship
(the First Amendment). Gay experience resists making so much of the public-
private distinction. The closet that obstructed lesbian and gay nomic identity
was enforced by institutions of private (corporate) as well as public (state)
authority. Most important was discrimination by employers, both corporate and
state. The tangible fear of losing one's job was and remains, next to family
shame, the most powerful motivator for gay people to remain closeted. When
gays came out in great numbers and asserted political power, their second
agendum, after easing police harassment, was to end state employment
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. At the same time, gay
activists called for laws prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in private
workplaces and public accommodations as well.'46
Antidiscrimination statutes such as the District's Human Rights Act are
therefore important and productive for ending the regime of the closet and
assuring gay people equal citizenship. This normative point finds ample
support in caselaw. As Judge Mack held, remedying private discrimination or
censorship can be the sort of compelling state interest that would justify some
public censorship. In addition to Bob Jones, discussed above, the Supreme
145. One might distinguish Georgetown's forced masquerade from the students' forced masquerade.
Pushing an institution into a closet does not harm human lives as much as doing that to individuals, and
the Roman Catholic nomos is in no important way threatened by this closet. I doubt these distinctions as
a matter of fact. The lives of individual priests and officials at Georgetown in the 1980s (some of them
homosexuals who had chosen lives of celibacy, others who were sexually active) were implicated by forced
recognition. To the extent that the latter distinction is an appeal to comparative powerlessness in our
society, one should consider that anti-Catholic prejudice remains palpable in the United States, that
Georgetown is in the uncomfortable position of being a religious island surrounded by a sea of secularity
in the nation's capital, and that the District government sometimes treats gays with more respect than It
treats Georgetown.
146. The District's Human Rights Act (1973 and 1977) was the first jurisdictionwide law to this effect;
California (1979) and Wisconsin (1982) were the first states to protect against anti-gay job discrimination
by court decision and statute, respectively. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2512 (1981); Gay Law Students Ass'n
v. Pacific Tel. & Tel., 595 P.2d 592 (Cal. 1979); Wts. STAT. ANN. § 101.22 (West 1988 & 1996 Supp.).
Massachusetts (1989), New Jersey (1991), Hawaii (1991), Minnesota (1991), Vermont (1991), California
(1992), Connecticut (1993), and Rhode Island (1995) have all adopted job discrimination statutes in the last
decade. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 98, ch. 15 1B, § 4 (Vest 1990 & 1996 Supp.); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 5-4, 5-12 (West 1991); HAW. REV. STAT. § 368-1 (Supp. 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03
(West 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495 (1992); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.1 (West 1992); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 46a-81c (West 1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-5-5, 28-5-7 (1995). More than 150 municipal
and county jurisdictions have adopted similar policies. See NAN HUNTER ET AL., THE RIoHTS OF LESBIANS
AND GAY MEN: THE BASIC ACLU GUIDE TO A GAY PERSON'S RIoHrrs 204-08 (3d ed. 1992). In 1996,
the U.S. Senate came within one vote of passing the federal Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA)
of 1995, S. 2056, 104th Cong. (1996), which would have prohibited sexual orientation discrimination in
the entire country.
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Court has recognized the same idea in cases involving sex discrimination. In
Roberts v. United States Jaycees,1"7 the Court upheld the application of
Minnesota's Human Rights Act to require the Jaycees, a young men's
community service organization, to admit women. Writing for the Court,
Justice William Brennan conceded that the antidiscrimination law burdened the
Jaycees' First Amendment associational rights but ruled that the law served a
compelling state interest that was unrelated to any expressive purpose of the
Jaycees as an association."" Like Judge Mack in the Georgetown case,
Justice Brennan in the Jaycees case found censorship on both sides of the
controversy. When state censorship is invoked to remedy private censorship or
discrimination, the anticensorship principle should not be dispositive. Roberts
and Bob Jones illustrate how public values are implicated on each side of the
equation. While First Amendment liberty values are implicated in state
censorship, Fourteenth Amendment equality values are implicated in the state
justification.
4. The Value of Accomnodation
The Georgetown case is the quintessential hard case because identity
speech values and constitutional norms were implicated for both contending
parties or nomoi. How should society or the legal system resolve colliding
norms such as those in the Georgetown case? American law talk has
traditionally spoken of colliding norms in win/lose terms: One norm must
prevail, the other must be quashed by a jurispathic court.'49 Scholars have
challenged this way of thinking. Writing from a variety of perspectives, these
scholars maintain that decisionmakers ought to seek ways to reconcile or
accommodate colliding norms, rather than just choosing one and suppressing
the other.150 This theme is prominent in Judge Mack's opinion for the
Georgetown case. The other judges posed the issues in starkly dichotomous
win/lose terms: Either Georgetown was required to recognize the gay and
lesbian student groups, with all the attendant benefits, or it was not.Is' This
way of posing the issue sharpened the normative conflict in the case. Over the
objection of most of her colleagues, Mack found this an unproductive way of
looking at the case and bifurcated the issue into a recognition-endorsement
147. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
148. See id. at 622-29.
149. See Cover, supra note 6, at 40--44; Robert M. Cover. Violence and the lbrd. 95 YALE LJ 1601
(1986).
150. For discussions of alternative ways to treat colliding norms. see ROGER FIsHER & WILuA.u% URY,
GETTING TO YEs: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHoUT GIVING IN (Bruce Patton ed , 2d ed. 1992). CAROL
GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982); Melvin Aron Eisenberg. Private Ordering Through Negotiation:
Dispute-Settlement aud Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REV. 637 (1976)
151. See Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Cir. v Georgetown Univ, 536 A.2d I,
46-47 (D.C. 1987) (Ferren, J., concurring in pan and dtssenting in pan); id at 62 (Belsen. J . concumng
in part and dissenting in part).
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feature, which reflected Georgetown's core objection, and an access-to-benefits
feature, which reflected the students' main demands.' 52 Analytically, this
permitted Mack to save the Human Rights Act from serious constitutional
difficulty, while preserving its core policy. Practically, the move enabled her
to show both sides that she had attended to their key interests and to offer a
result that accommodated the most significant nomic needs of both groups.
Is this approach unprincipled, as concurring Judge Theodore Newman
suggested and the dissenting judges charged? Mack's opinion advanced the
nondiscrimination principle by requiring Georgetown to provide tangible
benefits to the bisexual, lesbian, and gay student groups. Her dissenting
brethren charged that she violated the nondiscrimination principle by not
requiring recognition as well (Ferren and Terry) or that she violated the
anticensorship principle by forcing Georgetown to allow an openly gay
presence (Belson and Nebeker). Notwithstanding these charges, it is unfair to
assail Mack for being unprincipled, as she was accommodating two principles
that collided in the particular case. The only legitimate criticism of her
approach is that it reached an incorrect accommodation of the principles.
The coming-out experience provides support for Judge Mack's
accommodation. Coming out of the closet to one's friends and family has in
the last two generations been the defining moment or cluster of moments for
many lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals. Because the gay person desires an
ongoing relationship with friends and family, coming out to them is an
invitation to equal treatment: You have been my parent/friend, and I want you
to continue to be my parent/friend now that you know more about me. This is
an invitation sometimes declined and sometimes accepted unconditionally.
Most often, however, the invitation is accepted with conditions, such as a tacit
insistence that the gay person be discreet in her discussions of sexuality.'
53
152. Judge Mack held that requiring Georgetown to "recognize" Gay Rights Coalition would be
identity-speech censorship and therefore refused to interpret the Human Rights Act to compel such
recognition, but she interpreted the Act to require Georgetown to provide the students equal access to
facilities and services so that they could carry on their nomic activities. See id. at 25-30 (opinion of Mack,
J.). Judge Mack was playing upon ambiguities in the word "recognition." She was treating it as an
expression of Georgetown's identity, but university recognition at Georgetown usually connotes nothing
more than an administrative ticket student groups have to punch to get the tangible benefits (an office, a
phone, university publicity for their events) of being a student organization. Georgetown itself did not
consider recognition and tangible benefits to be different, nor had the students in their original challenge.
See id. at 20 n.16. Only Mack insisted upon their disaggregation into an identity component (recognition)
that could not be regulated and a conduct component (tangible benefits) that could be. See id. While this
move can be criticized as a semantic formalism, it served the functional goal of affirming the anticensorship
rule on behalf of both parties: The students should be free to express themselves within the university
community, but Georgetown should be equally free to express its commitment to compulsory
heterosexuality. Importantly, once Mack announced her judgment, both the students and the university
found her disaggregation liberating. See Letter from Timothy J. Healy, S.J., to the Faculty and Alumni of
Georgetown University (Mar. 28, 1988) (on file with the Yale Law Journal).
153. See, e.g., Rodney Christopher, Explaining It to Dad, in BoYs LIKE Us, supra note 116, at 302-11
(describing author's father who will not discuss son's sexuality). For other examples of accommodation,
see Ron Caldwell, Out-Takes, in BoYs LIKE Us, supra note 116, at 270 (recounting author's promise to
father not to tell his younger brother about his homosexuality until his brother's high school graduation);
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The conditions themselves may change over time, as the parent/friend becomes
accustomed to the gay person's identity and as she talks about the issues her
coming out raises. Is it unprincipled for the openly gay person to trim her
openness in order to accommodate the needs of other persons?
Philip Bockman's story Fishing Practice, recounts the shock his disclosure
yielded for his parents.'54 His father implored Bockman to soften the blow
of disclosure to his ill mother by agreeing to see a psychiatrist. This Bockman
agreed to do; happily for him, the psychiatrist turned out to be a "friend of
Dorothy." The knowledge that he was seeking professional help made it easier
for his parents to deal with this new knowledge; each parent privately
expressed continued love but was not yet comfortable talking about the subject.
Bockman writes:
Once, I expressed my frustration to my father about "the silent
treatment." "We're trying," he explained. "Please give us time." He
smiled, and I was reminded of an incident from my childhood, at
about the age of six. He had taken me fishing. He hauled in one fish
after the other, while I caught none. At the end of the day, I burst out
crying. Kneeling beside me, he told me gently, "Don't be too sad.
Remember, it takes a long time to get good at something. Be patient.
Don't think of today as fishing, just think of it as fishing
practice."' 55
After several years, Bockman brought his lover home to meet his parents, who
welcomed the friend but still did not feel comfortable talking about
homosexuality.'56 Still later, after his mother's death, the author found his
father positively affirming and finally willing to talk.'" Bockman's coming
out of the closet with his family occurred over a period of discursive time, not
suddenly, as on the road to Damascus. Judge Mack's judgment gave
Georgetown some practice time before it fully assimilated the gay groups, the
same discursive breathing room Bockman gave his parents. The question
remains, How much "equality practice" is required before the gay person, or
the state, asks for more?
5. Principles of Accommodation: Comparative Need and Dialogue
The circumstances of Bockman's and other people's stories are familiar.
A gay person (group) expresses sexual identity to a shocked loved one
and William Sterling Walker, January 18. 1989. in BoYs LIK Us. 3upra note 116. at 293-301 (dcscnbing
mother who accepts her son's homosexuality but does not want him shanng food with his niecs and
nephews).
154. See Philip Bockman, Fishing Practice. in Boys LIKE Us. supra note 116. at 73-81
155. Id. at 80.
156. See id.
157. See id. at 81.
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(institution) with which the gay person (group) wishes or needs to have an
ongoing relationship. To preserve the relationship in the face of knowledge that
creates a normative rupture, each side has to make accommodations, respectful
of the other's different views about sexuality. What principles should mediate
this accommodation? The substantive principle of accommodation is
comparative need: Each side should accommodate the central need of the other
unless that accommodatiln would sacrifice that side's central needs. The
procedural principle is dialogue: Each side should operate in good faith and
should remain open to information about the other and to the common interests
that are still shared.
These principles of accommodation are well illustrated in Judge Mack's
judgment. The University and the student groups by necessity were going to
have an ongoing relationship. There was ample ground for mutual respect, as
the students had all chosen to attend Georgetown, which in turn was happy to
admit openly gay students. As a Catholic school under direct papal supervision,
Georgetown's greatest need was an official distance from the gay groups, to
ensure that outsiders or the Vatican would not think that the university was
"approving" the student advocacies. The student groups' greatest need was
access to the services and benefits afforded other student groups, so that they
could have a stable presence within the university. Mack's opinion treated each
party with respect and gave each what it most needed. The students got access
to facilities and services on an equal basis with other student groups, and the
university was relieved of the formal association it feared would be inferred
from official recognition of the gay student groups. Mack's opinion also
created a structure friendly to dialogue between the parties over time. 5'
What of the charge that such accommodationist strategies preserve
remnants of the closet? Philip Bockman acquiesced in precisely that when he
agreed to go slowly with his parents. Rather than viewing this as nothing more
than a concession to prejudice, I consider it also a gesture of respect and an
158. There was no assurance this would occur, but Judge Mack's opinion gave it a chance. I joined
the Georgetown Law Center's faculty soon after the Court of Appeals' decision and became the sponsor
of the Law Center's bisexual, gay, and lesbian student group. I found the Law Center completely supportive
of student efforts to create a healthy gaylesbian community and to provide informative programs for all
students and faculty. Father Alexei Michalencko, the Law Center's Catholic chaplain, has been a counselor
for students of all orientations and has materially supported gay scholarship as well as gay community at
the Law Center. The main campus was also supportive, and the priests who run the school have been kind
and respectful of gay identity and issues. The apparatus Mack set in motion has impelled the students and
the priests into a productive dialogue, where agreement and mutual respect have dominated disagreement.
In 1988, Congress enacted the Armstrong Amendment, Pub. L. No. 100-462, § 145, 102 Stat.
2269-314 (1988), which conditioned federal funding for the District upon the City Council's adoption of
an amendment to the Human Rights Act that would relieve religious institutions of obligations not to
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. Significantly, Georgetown lent no support to that
amendment, which the courts invalidated for its coercion of speech by the Council. See Clarke v. United
States, 886 F.2d 404 (D.C. Cir. 1989), vacated as moot, 915 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en bane). Congress
then directly enacted the amendment pursuant to its constitutional power over the District; Georgetown
neither supported the second Armstrong Amendment nor sought to take advantage of it. Judge Mack's
principled accommodation held firm.
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open door to further progress. Gay and, especially, lesbian experience is that
coming out of the closet is not an all-or-nothing matter. It is instead a process
of mutually respectful education, dialogue, and accommodating the greatest
needs of one another. Another caution worth considering is that the closet is
not unalloyedly bad. Good manners and common decency require that we
closet our feelings much of the time. The closet is a mediation between my
desire to express and your desire not to see.
A concern about using these coming-out experiences as constitutional
exemplars arises from the view that we should expect greater acceptance and
neutrality from the state than we do from private families and institutions. This
is true with regard to rules applicable to the state itself. Even if families and
institutions are permitted to discriminate against gay people, the state should
not be permitted to exclude a group of worthy citizens for reasons of prejudice.
But the converse is also true. That the state as employer ought not discriminate
on the basis of sexual orientation in its own employment and contracting
policies, perhaps as a matter of constitutional law, does not mean that the state
also must require private institutions to follow the same nondiscrimination
policy.'59 When the state seeks to censor my expression or discriminate
against me, I am on strong constitutional ground in resisting; when the state
seeks to impose my expression on your turf or to silence your opposition to
open homosexuality, I am on much weaker constitutional ground. The
continuum from nuclear family to the regulatory state parallels a continuum of
defensible imposition of public equality goals, with the state being most
defensible and the family being least. Where did Georgetown fit on this
continuum? Consider this final lesson from the coming-out literature.
6. The Value of Subcultural Diversity: A Nomic Autonomy Erception
Suppose Philip Bockman's family had expelled him because of his sexual
orientation. A gay perspective would lament that too-frequent reaction.
Nowhere is the closet more stifling than within the family, as most coming-out
stories indicate. Yet no gaylegal theory argues that the state can force a family
to take back its openly gay relative, even though that would be justified in the
abstract by the nondiscrimination principle."6 Why is it that we are generally
unwilling to regulate the family in this way? It is decidedly not because the
family is immune from state regulation; the police can justifiably intervene in
response to physical and sexual abuse by parents of their children. If the state
159. In fact, one gay author believes that the only desirable nondiscrination rules arc those
applicable to state policy. See ANDREW SULLIVAN. VIRTUALLY NORMAL 171 (1995)
160. One can imagine other state mechanisms that might help. educauon for adults as well as minors
about the "facts" concerning homosexuality, state counseling services for parents or their gay children, and
mediation of parent-child disputes.
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regulates physical violence within the family, why not regulate emotional
violence as well?
The answer lies in my earlier critique of Kulturkampf. State censorship of
family life would be more perilous and less promising than its suppression of
dissident communities through the Kulturkampf described in Part 1. The
internal emotional dynamics of a family cannot easily be regulated without
undermining or destroying the creative dimensions of family. The best solution
for familial homophobia is mutual accommodation according to the principles
of comparative need and dialogue described above. It is increasingly rare for
accommodation not to work, but if it does not the better alternative is for the
gay child to separate from the family, rather than for the state to impose
tolerance from above. This is both the normative advantage and weakness of
families. The parents can inculcate values, which the child assimilates in some
ways and rejects in others; at some point, the offspring must go out into the
world, and her normative heritage will evolve in yet new directions.
Today, that evolution can be informed or assisted by gay subcultures that
exist in most American cities. This nomos of like-feeling and potentially
supportive individuals is particularly important and necessary for gay people
who have lost their blood families and who need new, or supplemental,
families of choice. Religious subcultures have long served this useful purpose
of supplementing blood families, and in today's society, gay subcultures work
alongside religious ones. Some of the most poignant coming-out stories are
those involving gay people who are emerging from a religious cloister.
Essex Hemphill's The Other Invisible Man is a story of the young author's
sexual initiation with an older man, George Hart of Washington, D.C.' The
experience was liberating as well as thrilling for the author, but the story is
more about Hart. The older man with the baritone voice was a person of
"multiple identities," a Christian believer, man of color, homosexual, macho
boxer. "Each identity was capable of causing him profound pain and profound
invisibility. Each mask he wore could put him at risk, even as it served to
protect him .... But each false identity was a chosen denial . ...,,16' The
author and Hart were intimate in an Episcopal church where Hart worked and
worshipped, a church that in the 1970s would have been shocked by
homosexuality in any locale. When Hart died not long after their friendship,
the author lamented the lost possibilities of a life lived in a closet impelled by
his chosen religion as well as by his unchosen society. 63 Hart might have
been better off if his church had welcomed gay people, or if he had left the
church altogether. But neither can reliably be imposed from above by the state:
161. See Essex Hemphill, The Other Invisible Man, in BoYs LIKE Us, supra note 116, at 176-85.
162. Id. at 184.
163. On the complex closeting of homosexuals within African-American religious communities, see
Harlon L. Dalton, AIDS in Blackface, DAEDALUS, Summer 1989, at 205, 215.
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The second was a matter of Hart's choice, the first a matter of his religion's
choice.
My interpretation of stories like Hemphill's is that, while society's
contribution to closeted sexuality must end as a matter of law, the church's
contribution, like the family's, is not susceptible to legal intervention. Like the
family, the church can be support or torture for the gay person. When it is the
latter, accommodation usually does not work, but state intervention (in the
name of the nondiscrimination principle) works no better, and at great cost. A
virtue of American society is the freedom to leave unproductive associations
and form new, more productive ones. Just as the heterogeneity of families is
good for America, so is the heterogeneity of subcultural nomzoi, so long as
their members have the option of separating. Unless she leaves the country, on
the other hand, the individual cannot easily separate from the public culture,
and this exception for nomic autonomy applicable to families and churches
should not apply to institutions in the world.
This idea has direct relevance to liberty/equality clashes. Concurring in the
Roberts judgment, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor relied on the fact that the
Jaycees were a commercial organization, and therefore not entitled to the
strong First Amendment protection that associations promoting a message
receive." She considered the Jaycees a garden-variety public
accommodation not closely linked to any community of ideas or values. The
closer an institution is to the center of a nonos, the greater freedom that
should be afforded to it by the state. Characteristic of a viable nomic
community is that it links its members together through the inculcation of
values. Those values create discrimination and closets, but members objecting
to discrimination have the option of leaving, and nonconforming members who
refuse to be closeted can be kicked out. Religions are the classic nomoi, of
which lesbian and gay communities are looser, more informal examples.
What is Georgetown University? It claimed that it was part of the Roman
Catholic nomos, and therefore exempt from the nondiscrimination principle, but
that claim was undermined by the fact that its admissions, governance, and
scholarly traditions were (and are) overwhelmingly secular. Like the Jaycees,
Georgetown diluted its nomic claims by entering the world and inviting
religious and sexual outsiders into its world. Unlike the Jaycees, however,
Georgetown could have presented a nomic claim as a university insisting upon
its academic freedom. Georgetown did not make such a claim, perhaps because
the nomic values developed by universities in the Western tradition are
diversity of viewpoint, vigorous debate, and intellectual challenge-all values
suggesting recognition of the gay student groups.
164. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees. 468 U S 609. 633-36 (1984) (O'Connor. J. concumng
in judgment).
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Georgetown, therefore, did not present a good case for invoking a nomic
autonomy exception to the nondiscrimination principle. The application of a
human rights act to a Catholic seminary, on the other hand, would be much
less justifiable because such an institution is central to a nomic community.
Parochial schools also ought to be harder for the state to regulate than ordinary
private schools, not just because of the Free Exercise Clause, but for the more
general purpose of protecting nomic autonomy. Within its own nomos, the
Catholic Church ought to be free of state regulation, but the Church is fairly
subject to it when it enters the world of culture, commerce, and education. It
is for this reason that the proposed Employment Non-Discrimination Act, like
the state nondiscrimination laws, excepts "religiously affiliated institutions"
(parochial schools but not secularized ones like Georgetown) from its ambit.
Gay rights advocates put that provision in ENDA, and it should be retained.
III. APPLYING A JURISPRUDENCE OF COMING OUT TO OTHER
LIBERTY/EQUALITY COLLISIONS
The gaylegal principles I have identified as relevant to the Georgetown
case and supportive of Judge Mack's approach in it can be elaborated by
reference to subsequent (post-1987) legal developments. How would such
principles apply in other cases involving First Amendment/equality clashes?
This Part considers three provocative cases involving different kinds of
collisions between liberty and equality: Massachusetts's effort to require the
organizers of the Boston St. Patrick's Day Parade to allow an openly gay
marching group to participate; the effort of the California Fair Housing
Commission to require religious landlords to rent to unmarried couples; and
Indianapolis's effort to impose tort liability on pornographers whose work
causes harm to women. A jurisprudence of coming out insists that there are no
pat answers to these cases. Indeed, the theory put forth in this Essay demands
a more complex analysis than that adopted by the courts in each case.
A. The Boston Parade Case
A different forum for considering the principles developed above is the
Boston parade case, Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual
Group1 65 (GLIB). Since 1947, the South Boston Allied War Veterans
Council has organized and sponsored a large parade on March 17th to
commemorate both Evacuation Day and St. Patrick's Day, the former a major
veterans' event and the latter a major ethnic (Irish) celebration. This is the
major civic event of the year in Boston, and the city government lends its seal,
165. 115 S. Ct. 2338 (1995), rev'g Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group v. City of Boston,
636 N.E.2d 1293 (Mass. 1994).
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some money, and the city streets for the celebration. In 1992 GLIB was
formed and obtained a state court order for it to march in the parade, over the
Council's objections. GLIB's members were among the 10,000 marchers that
year (before 750,000 spectators), and they marched without incident. In state
court litigation the next year, GLIB won a trial court order that the parade was
a "public accommodation" barred from excluding GLIB under Massachusetts's
law prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination by public accommodations.
The trial court rejected GLIB's claim that the parade was a governmental event
subject to the First Amendment but ordered the Council to admit GLIB on the
same terms as other groups. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
affirmed that order; the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously reversed."
Justice David Souter's opinion for the Court started with the proposition,
instinct in the Court's prior cases, that parades such as the Boston parade are
expressive conduct entitled to First Amendment protection. GLIB's own
participation was likewise expressive-"to celebrate its members' identity as
openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual descendants of the Irish immigrants, to show
that there are such individuals in the community"' 67-but the First
Amendment was not implicated, because the Council and its parade were not
state actors according to the lower courts. This determination was not before
the Supreme Court because it was not appealed by GLIB. The Council
disclaimed any intent to discriminate against bisexual, lesbian, or gay
participants and only wanted to exclude GLIB's message, not its members per
se, as they could march in other contingents. The state court order requiring
the Council to include GLIB as a group "had the effect of declaring the
sponsors' speech itself to be the public accommodation.... But this use of the
State's power violates the fundamental rule of protection under the First
Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own
message."' 68 The Council's message was one of compulsory Irish
heterosexuality, a message that would be disrupted by the gay participants.
The legal question in Hurley was whether the state could require access
for GLIB, as the state did in 1992 and as the District of Columbia did in the
Georgetown case. Justice Souter's resolution successfully develops the
proposition that the government should not censor identity speech. It is,
however, problematic in exaggerating the coherence of the asserted expression
of community values and in slighting the serious state justification
(nondiscrimination) suggested by Bob Jones and Roberts.
The gaylegal principles outlined above are friendly to the result in Hurley
in terms of the way Justice Souter presented the case. The anticensorship
principle is key to the result and reasoning in Hurley, which in turn is an
166. See id.
167. Id. at 2346.
168. Id. at 2347.
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eloquent precedent for the proposition that the state cannot censor identity
speech. If gays have the right to express their sexual orientation, straights have
a right to express their disapproval. The nomic autonomy exception to the
nondiscrimination principle also lends support to the result. For Souter and his
colleagues, the Council represented the traditionalist community of Irish
Bostonians and, as such, ought to have maximal freedom to express their
orthodoxy on issues of sexual orientation. Given the nomic context of the case,
the nondiscrimination principle is not strongly implicated and cannot
counterbalance the general rule against censorship. With the conflict between
the anticensorship and nondiscrimination principles thus attenuated, the
principles associated with accommodation were not implicated in the case.
But there is more to Hurley than Justice Souter's opinion reveals.
Doctrinally, the queerest feature of the opinion is the way the Court's
governing precedent, Roberts, disappeared into a legal closet. It may be that
Souter felt the state courts were wrong to treat the parade as a public
accommodation, like the Jaycees in Roberts. Truly, the state courts were
stretching the meaning of public accommodation to reach parades,'69 and
Hurley can be read to cast doubt on the validity of such broad statutory
interpretations in future cases. Still, Justice Souter was stuck with the state
determination of the issue, because the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to
review state court constructions of state law.7° If the parade were a public
accommodation complaining that application of a state nondiscrimination law
to it violated the First Amendment, Roberts should govern. The state courts
followed Roberts's analytical framework; the Supreme Court scarcely bothered
to cite the precedent.
Under Roberts as applied by the trial court based upon its findings of fact
(binding on the Supreme Court unless clearly erroneous), Hurley is not such
an easy case. While the parade was not a commercial association in the way
that the Jaycees were, neither did the parade have an expressive agenda beyond
"Irish are great" and "veterans are wonderful." The Council was able to cite
only three instances (the KKK, an antibusing group, and a pro-life group)
when it had, during the four decades it had managed the parade, ever excluded
a group from the parade. Justice Souter analogized the Council to a composer
orchestrating the theme for a symphony, but Hurley's symphony had no theme
169. The Massachusetts statute defined a public accommodation as "any place.. . which is open to
and accepts or solicits the patronage of the general public," including but not limited to "a boardwalk or
other public highway" and "a place of public amusement, recreation, sport, exercise or entertainment."
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 92A (West 1990). The trial court found that the parade was "'an open
recreational event that is subject to the public accommodations law."' Quoted in Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2342.
That may be an overstatement. A theme parade would include elements of both recreation and expression,
and the Massachusetts law should have been interpreted more narrowly in order to avoid the constitutional
problems presented in Hurley.
170. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 521-65 (4th ed. 1996).
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and everybody was allowed into the orchestra, except recognizable
homosexuals. Allowed to participate in the 1993 parade were radio stations,
several candidates for public office, McGruff the crime dog, a nursing home,
a smoke shop, several beauty queens, the AFL-CIO, marching bands,
Budweiser beer, a water pollution association, a Baptist "Bible trolley,"
Northern Ireland AID, and Pepsi-Cola. 71 The trial court found, as a matter
of fact, a "lack of genuine selectivity in choosing participants and sponsors"
and rejected, as a matter of fact, the Council's argument that its exclusion of
"groups with sexual themes merely formalized that the Parade expresses
traditional religious and social values."' 72 The factual context of the Boston
St. Patrick's Day and Evacuation Day parade contrasts with that of New
York's St. Patrick's Day parade, which gays tried to crash as well. The trial
court in the New York case found that the Ancient Order of Hibemians who
ran the parade had always viewed their parade as expressing a particular
viewpoint, had been selective in whom they would allow to march, and had
rules restricting expression in the parade. 73 The New York findings justified
First Amendment concern much more than the Boston findings did.
At best, the Council came to its ideological message, compulsory
heterosexuality, only after GLIB sought to participate in the parade. More
realistically, there is no reason to believe the Council ever had a message, and
some reason to think they were simply excluding GLIB because of
antihomosexual animus, again unlike the New York case. In 1992, Hurley told
GLIB it was excluded because of "safety reasons and insufficient information
regarding [the] club.' 74 In 1993, Hurley told GLIB it was excluded because
its "sexual themes" clashed with a policy "that the Parade expresses traditional
religious and social values."' 175 At trial in 1994, Hurley testified under oath
that GLIB was excluded because its members were also members of ACT-UP
and Queer Nation and could therefore be expected to disrupt the parade.
176
Hurley's final justification for excluding GLIB was, according to the trial
judge, "because of its values and its messages, i.e., its members' sexual
orientation."'77 Given this record and the trial judge's finding of fact that the
Council's shifting reasons proved that they were pretexts for exclusion by
reason of sexual orientation alone, it was Justice Souter and not Hurley who
created a coherent message for the parade. Contrast the Court's sharp-eyed
discernment of an utterly occluded idea in the Boston parade case with the
171. See Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 636 NE.2d at 1296 n 9
172. Quoted in Hurley, 115 S. C. at 2342.
173. See New York County Bd. of Ancient Hibemians v. Dinkins. 814 F Supp 358. 361-62
(S.D.N.Y. 1993).
174. Irish-Anerican Gay Lesbian & Bisexual Group. 636 N.E.2d at 1295
175. Id.
176. There was no factual basis for that belief, and the tmal judge treated it as simply fabricated See
id. at 1295 n.8.
177. Id.
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Court's blindness to the expressive idea in the Jaycees case: Business is for
guys. A disturbing implication of this contrast is that the Court reflexively
considered the message in Roberts so off-limits that it denied the possibility
of a message, while it considered the message in Hurley so obvious that it
overrode findings of fact to insist that it must have been the message all along.
Relatedly, Roberts held that nondiscrimination is a compelling state interest
justifying restrictions on the Jaycees' right of association."17 An implication
of Roberts is that if a parade is a public accommodation, parade organizers
cannot exclude women or people of color or, to make the analogy to Hurley
closer, cannot require women marching in the parade to pass as men or people
of color to put on whiteface. The state's requirement of nondiscrimination
would trump any post hoc rationalization for such exclusions, under this
reading of Roberts. If such a parade cannot exclude women generally, why can
it exclude lesbians? Of course, Roberts might be limited to sex and race
nondiscrimination, which enjoy special constitutional status, but Justice
Brennan (the author of Roberts) has laid out a persuasive case for similar
public concern for sexual orientation discrimination. 179 Judge Mack's opinion
in the Georgetown case developed a more detailed case for that
proposition, 8' an argument that went unchallenged in the otherwise
compendious concurring in part and dissenting in part opinions. The Supreme
Court's decision in Romer v. Evans 8' suggests that the Brennan-Mack
position has some resonance with six Justices on the current Court, one of
whom wrote Hurley and all of whom joined it without reservation.
Roberts might better be limited to cases where the nondiscrimination
principle imposes only incidental burdens on rights of association and
expression, and not expanded to cases where nondiscrimination undercuts the
expression of a nomic community. For this reason, Roberts should not be read
to require New York's Hibernians to allow the lesbian and gay marchers.
Although the New York parade has become a civic event, it is organized by
and for Irish New Yorkers and purports to be an expression of traditional Irish
Catholic values. According to the trial court, it is in fact an expression of these
values. The same cannot be said, however, of the Boston parade. In Boston,
the parade was decidedly more civic than Irish. It celebrated Evacuation Day
along with St. Patrick's Day and included anyone who wanted to march. The
evidence of nomic expression in the Boston parade case not only was mighty
thin, but was rejected by the finder of fact.
178. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
179. See Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1011-17 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
180. See Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1,
31-38 (D.C. 1987) (opinion of Mack, J.).
181. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
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Even without reference to Roberts and to the assumption that the parade
was a public accommodation, the opinion in Hurley raised more questions than
it answered. At oral argument, Justice O'Connor asked whether the state could
require a circus parade to include protesters who objected to the way circuses
treat animals. 82 Because this hypothetical is an instance of pure viewpoint
rather than status discrimination, it was extremely off point, and this is
revealing in light of Justice Souter's opinion. The slip suggests that some of
the Justices treated the exclusion as one resting solely on GLIB's expression
rather than on its members' identity. This may have been the Justices'
assumption, but it was an assumption substantially rejected by the finder of
fact. Within the Court, only Justice Stephen Breyer showed any curiosity about
the relationship between GLIB's message and the identity of its members. In
one of the last questions of the oral argument, Justice Breyer asked Chester
Darling, lawyer for the Council whether GLIB's signs were "self-
identifications," or were they a "message"? Darling answered: "It's a message,
it's an identification, it's a proclamation .... "1183
The reason Darling was confused was that he assumed that GLIB's
identity was its message, an assumption shared by his clients by the end of the
trial. This was the central dilemma of both Hurley and Roberts. The Jaycees'
ideology was determined long before the women knocking at their door
impelled them to claim publicly that business is for guys. Women's mere
presence in the Jaycees undermined that ideological message; sex
discrimination was integral to the association and what it stood for. The
Council's ideology was determined only after GLIB came knocking,
whereupon it was proposed that Irish must be heterosexual. The mere presence
of openly lesbian, gay, and bisexual marchers would have undermined that
ideological message, and sexual orientation discrimination was integral to the
association and what it stood for. The main difference here between Hurley
and Roberts, however, is that the message would not have been undermined
had lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals been dispersed throughout John Hurley's
crowd because their sexual orientation would have been invisible to the
audience. By contrast, women such as Kathryn Roberts would have been
apparent in the Jaycees even without badges and signs. To amend my intuition
about the Council's always ambiguous message: It was not compulsory
heterosexuality so much as it was an apartheid of the closet this message
bespoke. Gay people should be unseen but not heard.
Like the Jaycees and Georgetown cases, the Boston parade case was one
where identity speech was implicated on both sides of the controversy. I am
unhappy to report that both Supreme Court cases obscured this collision; only
182. See 1995 US Trans Lexis 89, *25.
183. Id. at *42. Justice John Paul Stevens posed a few follow-up questions suggesting thts paralel.
If the Council excluded a Jewish group because its members wanted to wear yarmulkes. wouldnt the
exclusion be due to the marchers' religious "identity" as well as their "'message'*" Id at *42-43
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the D.C. court dealt forthrightly with the collision. Viewed in its proper factual
context, Hurley failed to implicate the anticensorship principle as strongly as
the Court suggested and implicated the nondiscrimination principle in ways the
Court ignored. With regard to the former, there was never an explicit theme
for the parade. It is therefore unclear why Hurley excluded GLIB, and whether
his views reflected the sense of other paraders. Moreover, the
nondiscrimination principle suggests that GLIB should have been allowed to
participate in the parade. 8 4 Like the Georgetown case, the Boston parade
case was one where the courts should have been open to accommodation. The
principle of comparative need would suggest that GLIB should have been
allowed to march, as it did in 1992, without incident, and that other marching
groups could have chosen to distance themselves from GLIB if they desired,
either physically, through their place in the queue, or expressionally, with signs
proclaiming family values. Alternatively, the Council itself could have issued
disclaimers either in the media, in programs for the march, or on its own
banners." 5 The dialogue principle would suggest that the courts could have
required GLIB's inclusion but directed the parties to work out an arrangement
subject to judicial supervision.
An important question is whether Hurley, which is now the leading
Supreme Court precedent, overrules Gay Rights Coalition, a lower court
decision operative only in the District of Columbia. Although Roberts
presumably survives Hurley, Roberts may be confined to the sex and race
discrimination context. Therefore, Roberts is not readily available as a source
of distinction. In my opinion, if Hurley is understood in its precise factual
context, it is substantially inconsistent with Gay Rights Coalition. There are
several different ways to distinguish the cases if Hurley is understood in the
way Justice Souter presented the decision, however. For one thing, the
Massachusetts courts were stretching their antidiscrimination law to impose
what Justice Souter thought was a direct burden on free expression, while the
District of Columbia court was narrowly construing its antidiscrimination law
to avoid a direct burden on free expression. This makes the District's decision
more attractive than Massachusetts's. Indeed, the best reading of Hurley is to
establish the following canon of statutory interpretation: General
antidiscrimination statutes will not be read expansively, beyond their clear
184. The nomic autonomy exception seems substantially inapplicable here. There remained a plausible
but unclear case for state involvement in the Boston parade under either federal or (more likely) state
constitutional law. Whether or not the city could be deemed a coparticipant, the Boston parade was
indisputably a major civic event drawing in the entire community and including many contingents with no
connection to the Irish or to Evacuation Day. Even less than the Georgetown case, the Boston parade case
was not limited to a nomic community alone; it involved the whole community.
185. This has been a technique used in cases where shopping malls are required to provide access to
unpopular groups, see PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980), but Justice Souter's
opinion rejected the technique because he believed it would dilute the parade's expressive message. If
Souter's view were supported by the facts of the case, I would agree, but there was no theme beyond the
bromides noted earlier.
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application, when the broad reading would directly burden protected First
Amendment rights. Such a clear statement rule not only would ameliorate
clashes between nondiscrimination and free speech norms but would
appropriately place the burden on the legislature to consider First Amendment
values when it adopts antidiscrimination laws.'6
My reading might make too little of Hurley, but the analytical problems
with its reasoning suggest that it is a precedent to be applied cautiously. In any
event, there is an explicit suggestion in the decision that could rescue Mack's
resolution of the Georgetown case. At the very end of his opinion, Justice
Souter distinguished New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York,'8 a
case in which the Court had applied Roberts to uphold a public
accommodations ordinance against facial First Amendment attack. Justice
Souter read New York State Club as permitting accommodation of colliding
norms. The nondiscrimination principle could be applied to assure women and
people of color the tangible benefits of membership in social clubs, such as
networking, but the clubs would be left free to engage in the same expressive
activity as before.'88 I am more struck by the ambiguities of the New York
State Club case and the Boston parade case than was Justice Souter.
Nonetheless, Justice Souter was open to the sort of dialogic accommodation,
encompassing tangible benefits but not official recognition, that Mack crafted
in the Georgetown case.
B. The Presbyterian Landlord Case
Consider the application of the foregoing ideas to a recent case. Evelyn
Smith owned four rental units in Chico, California. Smith was a member of the
Bidwell Presbyterian Church and believed that sexual cohabitation outside of
marriage was sinful and contrary to her religion. It was for that reason she
refused to lease a unit to Gail Randall and Kenneth Phillips, an unmarried
cohabiting couple. The Fair Employment and Housing Commission ruled that
her refusal was discrimination on the basis of marital status, in violation of the
state's fair housing law, and ordered her to rent to unmarried couples and pay
Randall and Phillips modest damages. Smith objected that the order violated
her First Amendment and RFRA rights. Rejecting both constitutional and
statutory defenses, the California Supreme Court in Smith % Fair Employment
& Housing Commission'8 9 affirmed the agency rulings except for a reduction
in the damages awarded.
186. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P Fnckey. Quasi.Consururtonal Last Clear Statement
Rules as Constiutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593. 630-31 (1992)
187. 487 U.S. 1 (1988).
188. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group. 115 S Ci 2338. 2351 (1995)
189. 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996).
1997] 2463
The Yale Law Journal
Justice Kathryn Werdegar's opinion for the court held that the Supreme
Court's opinion in Employment Division v. Smith' precluded First
Amendment relief for Evelyn Smith because the antidiscrimination law was a
law of general application with only incidental burdens on religious free
exercise, like the statute upheld in Employment Division. Writing for only a
plurality of justices, Werdegar also ruled that RFRA did not afford a defense,
because Smith's free exercise of religion was not substantially burdened by the
requirement that she rent to unmarried couples. A fourth justice found RFRA
unconstitutional, therefore creating a majority of the court for the proposition
that Smith had no RFRA defense.' Werdegar argued that Smith could have
sold her rental units and invested her money in other activities that did not
confront her with a choice between obeying the law and following her
religious beliefs. Such an argument, of course, would have applied in Sherbert
v. Verner:92 The employee should simply find a job in which her
fundamentalist beliefs would be respected. Werdegar distinguished Sherbert on
the ground that job relocation would have been more of a hardship for Adele
Sherbert than reinvestment would have been for Evelyn Smith. Like the three
dissenting justices, 193 I am underwhelmed by this distinction. Sherbert itself
gave no credit to the degree of economic hardship. The Court held that the
state substantially burdened free exercise when it "forced [the believer] to
choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits,
on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order
to work, on the other hand."' 94 Although the Supreme Court has declined to
extend Sherbert's First Amendment holding beyond its facts (denial of
unemployment compensation), Congress sought to codify Sherbert in
RFRA. t95 If RFRA is held to be constitutional, I would read the statute to
encode a central lesson of the jurisprudence of coming out: Identity expression
can be chilled either by direct censorship or by indirect discrimination.'96
Identity speech values, therefore, should inform our reading of RFRA. The
key questions are these: Does the state's rule closet religious identity by a
190. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
191. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d at 931 (Mosk, J., concurring).
192. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
193. See Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d at 942-51 (Kennard, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); id. at 966-69 (Baxter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Attorney
General v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 246 (Mass. 1994) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that state may
not legally impose choice between violating religious beliefs and withdrawing from commercial endeavor
on landlord refusing to rent to unmarried couple).
194. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404.
195. Construction of Sherbert is important not for the First Amendment inquiry, governed by Scalia's
opinion in Employment Division, which limited Sherbert to the context of unemployment compensation,
but for the RFRA inquiry, which codified Sherbert's approach statutorily.
196. Courts have applied RFRA to overturn state orders preventing a Roman Catholic school from
discharging a non-Catholic teacher, see Porth v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 532 N.W.2d 195 (Mich. Ct. App.
1995), requiring the Amish to mark their slow-moving horse-drawn buggies with orange triangles rather
than the silver tape they prefer, see State v. Miller, 538 N.W.2d 573 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995), and imprisoning
Rastafarians for using marijuana, see United States v. Bauer, 75 F.3d 1366 (9th Cir. 1996).
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forced conformity? Is the state rule justified as a remedy for the closeting
effects of private discrimination? Is there a way to protect the victims of
private discrimination without censoring religious identity? In the end, I see no
clear answer to these inquiries.
As to the first, it was undisputed in the case that Smith believed sex
outside of marriage and heterosexual cohabitation to be sinful, that this belief
was important to Smith's religious identity, and that the state forced her to
choose between the identity-belief and a penalty. The state rule did
discriminate against Smith's religious views. Under the rule, she could not, for
example, advertise her apartments "for married couples and singles only." On
the other hand, Smith remained free to preach against sex outside of marriage,
to bend the ears of her tenants on the subject, to post religious tracts at her
apartments, and so forth. Nor was it clear that Smith's belief system entailed
that it was a sin for her to deal with unmarried couples, whom she surely dealt
with on a daily basis in modem California. (I, too, am a Presbyterian, and that
is decidedly not a tenet of our faith.) This idea provides a sharper basis for the
California Supreme Court's plurality to distinguish Sherbert from Smith: Adele
Sherbert would have violated a direct command of her religious community by
obeying an employment requirement that she work on her Sabbath, while
Evelyn Smith would not have violated a direct command of her religious
community by obeying a nondiscrimination requirement that she rent to
unmarried couples.
Only the dissenting justices addressed the issue whether burdens on
religion are needed because of discrimination against couples such as Randall
and Phillips. Justice Joyce Kennard argued that the prohibition against marital
status discrimination, added to the housing statute in 1975, reflected legislative
concern only with single or divorced tenants and not cohabiting ones. There
was no evidence that unmarried couples suffered from unusual amounts of
discrimination or had trouble finding suitable housing; the importance of
nondiscrimination against unmarried couples was undercut by the other
discriminations the legislature had made in favor of married couples.""
Although California courts have recognized that the right to privacy includes
the right to cohabitation, including sexual cohabitation, with others who are not
related by blood, marriage, or adoption, 9' it is not clear that cohabiting
couples are pushed into a closet because of substantial discrimination against
them in the housing market.
The record was similarly bereft of facts needed to calibrate an appropriate
balance of the needs of landlords like Evelyn Smith and tenants like Gail
Randall and Kenneth Phillips. In that event, the dialogue principle becomes
197. See Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n. 913 P2d at 951-55 (Kennard. J. concumng in part and
dissenting in part).
198. See City of Santa Barbara v Adamson. 610 P.2d 436 (Cal 1980)
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key. Justice Marvin Baxter urged that the matter be remanded to the state
housing commission to develop a factual record to determine whether
exempting landlords like Evelyn Smith from the housing act's
nondiscrimination rule would undermine that rule in any material way.199 I
would go one step further than Baxter. All seven justices went along with the
plurality's interpretation of the 1975 amendment, which added
nondiscrimination on the basis of marital status, as protecting unmarried
cohabiting couples. This was a dynamic interpretation of the statute well
beyond the legislature's goal of protecting single men and women, especially
single mothers. The court justified the dynamic interpretation on the basis of
deference to the agency, but when dynamic interpretation runs up against
constitutional considerations, as in the case of the Presbyterian landlord, it is
inappropriate for courts to defer to agencies.
I would urge courts in such cases to follow Judge Mack's approach in Gay
Rights Coalition, where she construed a broad statute more narrowly than the
agency and the plaintiffs did, so as to accommodate the constitutional concerns
raised by Georgetown. If the legislature overrides the narrowing construction
and broadens the statute, then the constitutional issues are sharpened and the
court has a better idea of what policies might justify the constitutional
abridgments. If Justice Baxter's remand idea had prevailed, the agency should
have alerted the legislature that it was narrowing the statute's reach, and
perhaps reversing its earlier view that the law protected unmarried cohabiting
tenants as well as single tenants.
C. The Indianapolis Pornography Case
In 1983-84, Andrea Dworkin and Professor Catharine MacKinnon drafted
an ordinance to regulate pornography. The ordinance defined "pornography"
as "the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women, whether in pictures
or in words, that also includes" the presentation of women either in scenarios
of domination, as sexual objects for domination, or as sexual objects who
enjoy pain, rape, bondage, or penetration by objects; the ordinance provided
civil tort remedies for victims of pornography.20' Although the Mayor of
Minneapolis vetoed the measure, Indianapolis enacted the ordinance in April
1984. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit invalidated the
199. See Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d at 974-75 (Baxter, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
200. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 81, at 161-64.
201. The ordinance is excerpted at American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 324 (7th Cir.
1985), aff'd mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). Its history is recounted and analyzed in DONALD ALEXANDER
DOWNS, THE NEW POLrTICS OF PORNOGRAPHY (1989). The conceptual framework which generated the
ordinance is detailed in ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY (1979); subsequent defense of the statute is
provided by Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. RiV.
1 (1985).
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ordinance in American Booksellers Ass'n v. HudnI, 0" 2 and the Supreme
Court summarily affirmed. 2° s Under the approach set forth in this Essay, the
Supreme Court acted too quickly.
Judge Frank Easterbrook's opinion treated the ordinance as "thought
control," 204 the sort of regulation that classically violates the First
Amendment's core command that the state not impose ideological orthodoxy.
His opinion has been criticized as woodenly formalistic and hypocritical."°
The opinion can be contrasted with Regina v. Butler,' where the Supreme
Court of Canada upheld a less specific obscenity prohibition based on the
harms that pornography visits upon women: stimulation of specific assaults
upon women, abuse of women within the industry, and perpetuation of sexist
stereotypes about women. Butler, in turn, has been criticized as sex negative
and homophobic. 2 7
Gaylegal principles offer one way to understand these issues more deeply.
The pornography cases resemble the Boston parade and Georgetown cases
insofar as they implicate issues of identity speech and the problems associated
with closeting it. Professor Nadine Strossen has written the most detailed and
persuasive brief against antipornography laws based on the traditional problems
with this form of state action. 08 On her account, censorship of this sort
would likely be applied in ways that discriminate against works valuable to
women, deprive women and men of sexually explicit materials, and undermine
women's efforts to develop their own sexuality. Moreover, these laws would
be ineffective and would ultimately simply drive porn underground.2' Gay
experience with censorship, including censorship in Canada of lesbian
materials after Butler,21 is consistent with Strossen's arguments and would
add this one: By drawing lines and threatening to enforce them with the state's
own violence and domination, censorship contributes to a discourse of
sexuality that is furtive, nasty, and violent.2"'
202. 771 F.2d 325.
203. 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
204. Hudnut, 771 R2d at 328.
205. See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 232-35 (1996),
Mary Becker, Searching for Any Fixed Star. Regulation of Same-Sex Relationships but Protection for
Pornography (1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author),
206. 89 D.L.R.4th 449 (Can. 1992).
207. See NADINE STRoSsEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH. SEX. AND THE FIGHT FOR
WOMEN'S RIGHTS 229-44 (1995).
208. See generally id.
209. See id., see also Lisa Duggan et al., False Promises: Feminist Ann.Pornography L.egislation, 38
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 133 (1993); Jeffrey G. Sherman. Love Speech: The Social Utlty of Pornographv. 47
STAN. L. REv. 661, 691-92 (1995).
210. Systematic state persecution of a lesbian bookstore under Butler is detailed in JANINE FULLER
& STUART BLACKLEY, RESTRICTED ENTRY: CENSORSHIP ON TRIAL (1995). but the Canadian courts, as of
1996, have enjoined this persecution. See Little Sisters Book & Art Emporium v. Minister of Justice &
Attorney General, No. A901450 (Sup. Ct. B.C. Jan. 19. 1996).
211. Cf. David Cole, Playing by Pornography's Rules: 77te Regulation of Sexual Expression, 143 U
PA. L. REV. II (1994) (arguing that sexual expression subverts attempts at regulation)
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Gay experience also strongly disputes the views of writers who dismiss
pornography as "low value" speech, like libel and commercial speech.
Professor MacKinnon maintains that pornography "does not engage the
conscious mind" as traditionally protected (political) speech does.212 She is
right to say that hardcore porn has traditionally been treated by judges and
professors as more like sexual activity, which can be regulated, than like
communicative speech, which is hard to regulate. Both she and they are wrong,
however, to deny the communicative features of pornography. While
pornography is not identity speech in the same way student organizing was at
Georgetown University in the 1970s or carrying placards is in the Boston
parades, pornography does contribute images and knowledge that help people
formulate and understand their sexual identities.
Socially disapproved porn can have an informative value. It is worth
recalling that Radclyffe Hall's Well of Loneliness (1929) and Sappho
Remembered, a 1954 short story of lesbian romance, were considered obscene
by the censors of their eras simply because they described woman/woman
romance in positive terms.213 Not only do I consider Well and subsequent
lesbian novels, such as Ann Bannon's Odd Girl Out (1957), both intellectually
interesting and erotic, but thousands of women who read these books in their
youths found them affirming, instructive, and mind-bending as well.2 4 In
retrospect, the censors were wrong. They were not wrong because the sex
blinded them to the communicative value of the romances. To the contrary,
they were wrong because they did recognize their communicative value and
censored the books in order to stamp out those ideas. Such censorship was
foolish as well as inhumane, and sporadic judicial enforcement of the First
Amendment slowed these censors down in their heyday.
Sexual diversity is greater today than it was when Radclyffe Hall wrote
Well, and pornography has contributed to that sexual diversity. The gay
experience has been that pornography remains a trove of useful information
about sex-not only about the options for fitting one body part into another,
but also about various sexual practices and preferences and about subcultural
mores and customs.2 15 More fundamentally, gay porn communicates not just
212. CATHARINE MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 16 (1993); see also FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH:
A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH
(1993).
213. See One, Inc. v. Olesen, 241 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1957), rev'd per curiam, 355 U.S. 371 (1958)
(allowing Post Office to censor Sappho Remembered, but overturned by Supreme Court); People v. Friede,
233 N.Y.S. 565 (N.Y. Magis. Ct. 1929) (allowing police to censor Well). Friede was overturned in an
unreported decision by a three-judge panel in Special Sessions. See Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian
and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA. L. REV. 1551, 1557 n.37 (1993).
214. For a complex understanding of the place of Well in the formation of lesbian consciousness, see
Esther Newton, The Mythic Mannish Lesbian: Radclyffe Hall and the New Woman, 9 SIONS 557 (1984).
215. This point was first developed in SCoTT TUCKER, RADICAL FEMINISM AND GAY MALE PORN
(1983), and later in Sherman, supra note 209, at 681-89. But see JOHN STOLTENBERO, REFUSINO TO BE
A MAN: ESSAYS ON SEX AND JUSTICE (1989) (agreeing with MacKinnon that gay pornography is harmful).
2468 [Vol. 106: 2411
Eskridge
information, but identity. If you like these pictures of men bound and gagged,
then you are a "bondage and discipline" person. In our culture, your sexual
tastes go as much to your personal identity as do your religious tastes. Would
it be imaginable to say that the state can censor religious literature such as the
erotic Song of Solomon on the ground that it is "low value" speech? As
Professor Jeffrey Sherman has recently argued, MacKinnon's insistence that
antipom feminism target gay por as well as straight porn is too quick a leap.
Sexual materials depicting same-sex intimacy serve many expressive,
informative, and identity-creating purposes uniquely useful to sexual-
orientation minorities.216
In short, Judge Easterbrook was right to reject assertions that pornography
is not communicative and to insist that what pornography often communicates,
sexuality as violence or domination, is why feminists want to censor it.
Gaylaw should support his view that the First Amendment is deeply implicated
in antiporn censorship, but ought not accept Easterbrook's easy dismissal of
MacKinnon's reasons for suppressing this speech. Easterbrook deferred to the
legislative findings that pornography does cause harm, both physical and
personal, to women but then closed off serious analysis by asserting that the
First Amendment simply does not allow suppression of speech because of its
content, its ability to persuade. That is untrue. The First Amendment allows the
state to regulate cigarette ads that may persuade people to harm themselves by
smoking,2 17 false alarms that may persuade people to run from a building
that is not really on fire,218 threats or lies that persuade people to hand over
money they would otherwise not relinquish, "19 and so on. In at least one
(controversial) decision, the Supreme Court went further, to hold that the state
can regulate "group libel," statements that a minority group is depraved,
unchaste, and so forth, subject to the defendant's showing that the statement
was both true and nonmalicious.
22
Contrary to Judge Easterbrook, the discussion cannot end with the
anticensorship principle, the finding that pornography involves communication
and even implicates identity speech. One must consider also the
216. See Sherman, supra note 209, at 681-89
217. See Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932) (upholding statute prohibiting billboard
advertising of cigarettes).
218. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U S. 47, 52 (1919) (stating in dictum that First Amendment
does "not ... protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre")
219. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv Comm'n. 447 US 557 (1980) (holding that
commercial speech that is "misleading" enjoys no First Amendment protection); see also Virginia State Bd
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Common Cause, 425 U.S 748. 771-72 (Stevens, J , concumng) (CThe
First Amendment as we construe it today does not prohibit the state from tnsunng that the stream of
commercial information flow clearly as well as freely.").
220. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) Some feel that the decision does not survive
New York Tunes Co. i: Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), but others find robust First Amendment wisdom in
the group libel idea, see, e.g., Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim s
Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989). At the very least, the requirement that defendant show both truth
and lack of malice has been overruled by Sullivan.
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nondiscrimination principle, whether suppressing pornography materially
contributes to public equality of the sexes without trampling the autonomy of
a nomos. There is no defensible way to avoid MacKinnon's central factual
assertions, that pornography hurts women's ability to participate in the public
sphere and that such hurt can be alleviated by state suppression. Much ink has
been spilled on the empirical question whether pornography actually does
contribute to violence against women, 2 ' and I claim that the legal system
was wrong to reach closure on the First Amendment issue before a clear
answer was reached concerning the effect-on-women issue.
Consider one angle. Social scientist Edward Donnerstein, whose work has
been cited by both sides of the debate, now concludes that "it is the violent
images fused with sexual images in some forms of pornography, or even the
violent images alone, that account for many of the antisocial effects reported
by social science researchers. '2 He and his colleagues emphasize that
"materials that were merely sexual in nature had no effect on aggressive
behavior."223 If this observation is borne out over time, the Indianapolis
ordinance would then be in tension with the comparative need principle, as
most of its prohibitions regulate material that sexualizes and subordinates
women, without any nexus to violence.224
Even for pornography depicting sexual violence, there is cause for concern.
Sexualized violence is not limited to pornography but is commonplace in
television, movies made for general release, and magazines of all sorts. Would
the First Amendment tolerate censorship of these media as well as under-the-
counter pornography? This is not a ridiculous question, in light of
MacKinnon's charge that pornography, and surely popular culture as well,
contribute to women's subordination by perpetuating stereotypical images of
women as helpless sex objects. Like much feminist theory, gaylaw would
attempt to identify a more effective way to resist violent or degrading
pornography, other than state censorship. Is there not a dialogic way to
accommodate the discrimination problems MacKinnon identifies and the
censorship concerns of the First Amendment?
The First Amendment tradition suggests that the best response to
objectionable speech is counterspeech. Antiporn feminists respond that
pornography silences women and, thereby, makes counterspeech unlikely. The
gay experience cuts against this response. Consider gay responses to movies
221. See, e.g., A'IORNEY GENERAL'S COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT 299-352 (1986);
Frederick Schauer, Causation Theory and the Causes of Sexual Violence, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 737.
For a response to the Attorney General's Report, see GORDON HAWKINS & FRANKLIN ZIMRINO,
PORNOGRAPHY IN A FREE SOCIETY (1988).
222. EDWARD DONNERSTEIN ET AL., THE QUESTION OF PORNOGRAPHY: RESEARCH FINDINGS AND
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 2 (1987).
223. Id. at 98. By sexual violence, Donnerstein et al. mean depictions of "sexual coercion in a sexually
explicit way," especially when the woman initially resists and then gives way to enjoyment. See id. at 89.
224. This is the criticism of Duggan et al., supra note 209, at 154.
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that depict gay people as predatory and worthy of execution. 22' Before 1962,
American movies were prohibited by the Motion Picture Production Code from
depicting "sexual perversion." When that prohibition was dropped, in part
because of its ineffectiveness and in part because of market demands, the
Code's seal of approval was immediately given to movies that featured pathetic
suicides by lesbian (William Wyler's The Children's Hour)2'6 and gay (Otto
Preminger's Advise and Consent)..7 characters. It was withheld from Basil
Dearden's Victim,2 28 a British thriller which depicted gay people with
sympathy.
The appropriation of lesbian and gay characters followed this dreary
pattern through the 1960s. Virtually all American movies depicted such
characters as sick, predatory, or violent, and often all three.229 Homosexuals
typically ended up dead by their own hands or at the hands of disgusted
heterosexuals, or, if they were lesbians, seduced and cured (for example, James
Bond's seduction of the amazon Pussy Galore in Goldfinger).2" Only after
Stonewall, with more out lesbians and gay men as potential moviegoers and
gaylib organizations such as Gay Activists Alliance breathing down the
censors' necks,231 did a more gay-affirmative cinema begin to develop,
relatively unimpeded by state censorship. The first significantly "gay"
American movie was William Friedkin's slavish adaptation of Mart Crowley's
depressing play, The Boys in the Band.
232
225. See Vrro Russo, THE CELLULOID CLOSET (1987). and the movie by the same name (Sony
Pictures 1996).
226. THE CHILDREN'S HOUR (United Artists 1961).
227. ADVISE AND CONSENT (Columbia 1962).
228. VicrmI (Alfred Filmakers Parkway 1961).
229. Homosexual characters often killed either the objects of their desires (Marion Brando in
REFLECrIONS OF A GOLDEN EYE (Warner Bros. & Seven Attsts 1967). Carol Kane in My SLsTER. MY
LOVE (Jerry Gross Organization 1977)), innocent third parties (Rod Steiger in No WAY TO TREAT .A LADY
(Paramount 1968), Tom Berenger in LOOKING FOR MR. GOODBAR (Paramount 1977). Christopher Reeve
and Michael Caine in DEATHTRAP (Warner Bros. 1982)), or themselves (Shirley Macainr in THE
CHILDREN'S HOUR (United Artists 1961), Rod Steiger in THE SERGEANr (Warner Bros & Seven Artists
1968)).
230. GOLDFINGER (United Artists 1964).
231. In 1973, the Gay Activists Alliance and the Nauonal Gay Task Force developed *'Some General
Principles for Motion Picture and Television Treatment of Homosexuality," See Russo. supra note 225.
at 220-21. The overriding theme of the various principles was that movies should not reinforce popular
myths and stereotypes about homosexuality and should, instead, present gay characters as natural, complex
human beings. For example, Principle 3 states: "Use the same rules you have for other minonties If bigots
don't get away with it if they hate Catholics, they can't get away with it if they hate gays Put another way.
the rights and dignity of homosexuals are not a controversial issue " Id. at 221
232. THE BOYS IN THE BAND (Cinema Center/Leo 1970). Although the malc characters were a
menagerie of popular stereotypes (the sissy, the dumb hustler, the acid wit concealing guilt, the tolerant but
shocked heterosexual), the movie also included a well-adjusted gay couple who displayed obvious physical
affection and dramatically reaffirmed their love at the end. The film gave even the stereotyped characters
human depth and sympathy. Just as Well of Loneliness was both depressing and liberating for some
lesbians, so was Crowley's Boys in the Band for some gay men. Indeed, the film could be viewed as a
searing indictment of the closet culture, for the unhappiness the film documents is. in pan. a product of the
outlaw status of gay relationships.
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The remainder of the 1970s saw a fair number of movies, the most
interesting of them made in Europe, reflecting a gay sensibility or at least more
complicated gay characters.233 Most American movies continued to treat gay
characters as sissy boys and butch women, but other (mostly European) movies
depicted more normal gay characters. When Hollywood in 1980 produced three
homophobic clunkers-William Friedkin's Cruising (United Artists), Paul
Schrader's American Gigolo (Paramount), and Gordon Willis's Windows
(United Artists)-it provoked angry protests from gay organizations and from
individuals fed up with Hollywooden stereotypes. Under constant market and
intellectual pressure since 1980, American movies have come to depict lesbian,
gay, and bisexual characters more realistically and less stereotypically, all
through the process of dialogic accommodation and without the censorship of
the past. Given that attitudes change slowly, it is remarkable that Hollywood's
depiction of gay characters has moved from The Children's Hour to
Philadelphia2 34 in only a generation-without any state censorship.
Education and discussion can affect people's attitudes about sexuality and
gender, and gay experience supports the idea that dialogue is better than
censorship. Some social science studies, in fact, suggest that the best way to
deal with violent pornography is by showing it to people and following the
show with personal narratives or debriefings explaining how abusive the sex
is to some women. The studies suggest, tentatively, that the combined exposure
to porn and counterporn reduces misogynistic attitudes more effectively than
exposure to feminist materials alone. 35 This is an insight that antiporn
feminists have taken to heart, as they have developed precisely such
countereducational programs where porn is shown and then deconstructed. In
light of the tangibly misogynistic themes of much porn and the public equality
goal, all as articulated by MacKinnon, at the very least the state has an
obligation as well as the authority to support feminist education and resistance
233. These include John Schlesinger's SUNDAY BLOODY SUNDAY (United Artists 1971), an amazing
film and my favorite; Luchino Visconti's DEATH IN VENICE (Alfa Cindmatographica & Productions ct
Editions Cindmatographiques Frangaises 1971); Bob Fosse's CABARET (Lorimar 1972), a highly ambivalent
adaptation of Christopher Isherwood's BERLIN STORIES (1945); Christopher Larkin's A VERY NATURAL
THING (Montage Creations, Inc. 1974); Sidney Lumet's sensationalist DoG DAY AFTERNOON (Warner Bros.
1975); George Schlatter's amusing NORMAN, Is THAT You? (MGM 1976); Wolfgang Petersen's THE
CONSEQUENCE (Solaris Film Prods. & Westdeutscher 1977); Nancy and Peter Adair's gay-affirming WORD
Is OUT (Mariposa Film Group 1977), which was electrifying for many of the lesbians and gay men who
saw it; Richard Benner's OUTRAGEOUS (Film Consortium of Canada 1977), a terrific forum for female
impersonator Craig Russell, as well as the same director's sensitive HAPPY BIRTHDAY GEMINI (United
Artists 1979); and Richard Lester's THE RITZ (Warner Bros. 1978), a lackluster adaptation of the wittier
Terence McNally play.
234. PHILADELPHIA (Tristar 1993).
235. See DONNERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 222, at 180-85; MARCIA PALLY, SENSE AND CENSORSHIP:
THE VANITY OF BONFIRES 34-36 (1991); Neil Malamuth & Edward I. Donnerstein, The Effects of
Aggressive-Pornographic Mass Media Stimuli, 15 ADVANCES EXP. PSYCHOL. 103, 129 (1982).
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to pornography. Gay people also have an obligation to examine the tendency
of gay porn to sexualize race-based stereotypes. 6
Equality comes on little cat's feet and not in a single leap or bound. This
lesson of the nation's experience with sex and race discrimination applies with
full force to gaylegal experience. Like the young Philip Bockman whose initial
foray into angling was just "fishing practice," the recently enacted sexual
orientation antidiscrimination laws are "equality practice" for the time being.
The ultimate goal of gay rights is full equality, but I doubt that will be
possible in the near term, and not just for pragmatic reasons.2" In some
instances, full gay equality would be a fundamental affront to liberty interests
of religious or traditionalist groups, in ways that full gender or race equality
no longer are.238 In such instances, accommodation is both likely and
appropriate, from a gaylegal as well as religious point of view.2 9
Accommodation and equality practice can be criticized from a gay
perspective as acquiescing in or perpetuating the apartheid of the closet. But
just as the Radicalesbians and other early gay liberationists were both naive
and wrong to think that the act of coming out would change everything,
today's gay radicals would be both naive and wrong if they believed that gay
equality trumps the rights of everybody else. It would be naive, because we are
the new "rights group" on the block, and human beings and their institutions
require time and struggle to internalize a new group. It would be wrong,
because the gay nomos should accept what the Roman Catholic and most other
religious nomoi have accepted, the need to respect and accommodate other
people's and other groups' normative space. In a country whose hallmark is
236. This has been documented in an excellent paper by my former student. Perry Chen See Perry
Chen, Jungle Negroes, Madame Butterflies, Hot Tamales: Talking About Race in the Dialogue of Love
Speech (Harvard Law School 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) To my chagnn. this
paper has found the path to publication blocked on several fronts,
237. See POSNER, supra note 29, at 318 (1992) (offering pragmauc arguments for excluding gays from
armed services and institution of marriage).
238. For example, even Bob Jones University in the 1970s accepted racial integration, its
discrimination was confined to prohibitions of interracial dating and marriage. The University's policy
would not have brought such censure from even the liberal Warren Court immediately after Brown The
Court in the 1950s refused to attack even state laws crminalizing interacial cohabitauon or marriage See
Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956). A decision like Bob Jones, penalizing a religious school for its
interracial dating policy, would have been inconceivable in the 1950s It became possible only after the
country and its religions had gone through thirty years of equality practice.
239. Notwithstanding the views of many religions that benign sexual variation is unacceptable for their
nomic communities, the public community ought to adopt this stance. Indeed, to reject the idea. and treat
gay communities less respectfully than religious ones for religious-inspired reasons, would be partial to
religion in ways that the Establishment Clause discourages Cf Rosenberger v Rector & Visitors of the
Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2521 (1995) (finding that "neutrality" required by Establishment Clause does
not tolerate partiality toward or exclusion of religious viewpoints but is satisfied "when the government.
following neutral criteria and evenhanded policies, extends benefits to recipients whose ideologies and
viewpoints, including religious ones, are broad and diverse")
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a balance of independent cooperation and autonomy, gay groups should join
religious groups in working together in the face of nomic competition.
To return to the idea that inaugurated this Essay, I also concede that my
effort to connect religion and sexual orientation as identity categories suitable
for antidiscrimination legislation can be criticized from a religious perspective
as connecting the religious with the profane, or even the sacrilegious. But just
as the "Save the Children" campaign in Dade County and other early
opponents of gay rights were both naive and wrong to think that open
homosexuality would corrupt children, today's religious conservatives would
be naive and wrong to deny the similarities between antireligious and anti-gay
prejudice. It would be naive because inconsistent with the historical record,
examined in Part I. It would be wrong because inconsistent with the charitable
principles at the heart of the large majority of religions in America. In a
country founded upon principles of religious liberty, we have prospered under
a public law philosophy embodying benign religious variation. Gaylaw's
challenge to American public law, and to our religions as well, is to consider
the truth of benign sexual variation, too.
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